Chronology of the procedure <\/strong>(paras 1-21)<\/p>\nThe Court first recalls that on 19 January 2023, the Secretary-General of the Â鶹APP officially communicated to the Court the decision taken by the General Assembly to submit the questions set forth in resolution 77\/247 adopted by the Â鶹APP General Assembly (hereinafter the \u201cGeneral Assembly\u201d) on 30 December 2022.<\/p>\n
Paragraph 18 of the resolution reads as follows:<\/p>\n
\u201cThe General Assembly, <\/em><\/p>\n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<\/p>\n
\n- Decides<\/em>, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the Â鶹APP, to request the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, to render an advisory opinion on the following questions, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Charter of the Â鶹APP, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and the advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004:<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
\n- a) What are the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and from its adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures?<\/li>\n
- b) How do the policies and practices of Israel referred to in paragraph 18 (a) <\/em>above affect the legal status of the occupation, and what are the legal consequences that arise for all States and the Â鶹APP from this status?\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
<\/p>\n
I. JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION <\/strong>(PARAS. 22-50)<\/p>\nAt the outset the Court observes that, when seised of a request for an advisory opinion, the Court must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to give the opinion requested and, if so, whether there is any reason why the Court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to answer the request.<\/p>\n
A. Jurisdiction <\/strong>(paras. 23-29)<\/p>\nThe Court first addresses the question whether it possesses jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion. It notes that, in accordance with the requirement in Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of its Statute, the Court must satisfy itself that the question on which it is requested to give its opinion is a \u201clegal question\u201d.<\/p>\n
The Court recalls that, in the present proceedings, the General Assembly put two questions to the Court. These questions relate first to the legal consequences arising from certain policies and practices of Israel as an occupying Power in a situation of belligerent occupation since 1967. Secondly, they relate to how such policies and practices affect the legal status of the occupation in light of certain rules and principles of international law and to the legal consequences which arise from this status. The Court considers that these questions are legal questions. In light of the above, the Court concludes that the request has been made in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and of the Statute of the Court and therefore that it has jurisdiction to render the requested opinion.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
B. Discretion <\/strong>(paras. 30-49)<\/p>\nThe fact that the Court has jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion does not mean that it is obliged to exercise it. Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute provides that \u201c[t]he Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the Â鶹APP to make such a request\u201d. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, this \u201cshould be interpreted to mean that the Court has a discretionary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions of jurisdiction are met\u201d. However, given its functions as the principal judicial organ of the Â鶹APP, the Court considers that its answer to a request for an advisory opinion \u201crepresents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused\u201d. However, only compelling reasons may lead the Court to refuse to give its opinion in response to a request falling within its jurisdiction. In view of the fact that some participants in the present proceedings have argued that there are compelling reasons for the Court to decline to give its opinion, the Court examines each of these in turn.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Whether the request relates to a dispute between two parties, one of which has not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court <\/strong>(paras. 33-35)<\/p>\nFirst, the Court examines the argument according to which the Court should decline to render an advisory opinion because the request concerns a bilateral dispute between Palestine and Israel, and the latter has not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court to resolve that dispute. The Court does not regard the subject-matter of the General Assembly\u2019s request as being only a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine. The involvement of the Â鶹APP organs, and before that the League of Nations, in questions relating to Palestine dates back to the Mandate System. Since resolution 181 (II) concerning the partition of Palestine was adopted by the General Assembly in 1947, the Palestinian question has been before the General Assembly, which has considered, debated and adopted resolutions on it almost annually. Thus, this issue is a matter of particular interest and concern to the Â鶹APP. The Court therefore considers that the issues raised by the request are part of the Palestinian question, including the General Assembly\u2019s role relating thereto. Consequently, the Court cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to give the opinion requested on the ground of circumventing the principle of consent to judicial settlement.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Whether the Court\u2019s opinion would assist the General Assembly in the performance of its functions<\/strong> (paras. 36-37)<\/p>\nThe Court then examines the argument according to which the Court should decline to reply to the questions put to it because the General Assembly is not seeking the Court\u2019s opinion on a matter with which it requires assistance, but rather seeks the Court\u2019s confirmation of particular legal conclusions relevant to the resolution of a bilateral dispute between Palestine and Israel. In the present instance, the request is put forward by the General Assembly with reference to its own responsibilities and functions regarding the issue of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (see A\/RES\/77\/247). The Court does not therefore consider that there is a compelling reason that should lead it to decline to give its opinion on the ground that such an opinion would not assist the General Assembly in the performance of its functions.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Whether the Court\u2019s opinion may undermine the negotiation process between Israel and Palestine <\/strong>(paras. 38-40)<\/p>\nTurning to the question whether, the Court should decline to reply to the questions put to it because an advisory opinion from the Court would interfere with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process laid out by the framework established in the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (hereinafter the \u201cOslo I Accord\u201d) and the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (hereinafter the \u201cOslo II Accord\u201d), and may exacerbate the Israeli-Palestinian disagreement, thereby compromising the outcome of negotiations, the Court considers that, in the present circumstances, this question is a matter of conjecture and the Court cannot speculate about the effects of its opinion. Therefore, the Court cannot regard this factor as a compelling reason to decline to respond to the General Assembly\u2019s request.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Whether an advisory opinion would be detrimental to the work of the Security Council <\/strong>(paras. 41-43)<\/p>\nThe Court then examines the argument according to which the Court should exercise its discretion to decline to answer the questions before it, or, even if the Court were to reply to these questions, it should take care that its reply does not interfere with the established framework for negotiations, since it is the Security Council, and not the General Assembly, which has primary responsibility for issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Court notes that whether the opinion of the Court would have an adverse effect on the negotiation framework is a matter of conjecture on which the Court should not speculate. Moreover, in view of the fact that the General Assembly has the competence to address matters concerning international peace and security, such as those raised in the questions it has posed, there is no compelling reason for the Court to decline to give the requested opinion.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Whether the Court has sufficient information to enable it to give an advisory opinion <\/strong>(paras. 44-47)<\/p>\nThe Court notes that some participants have raised the argument that the Court should decline to give an opinion because it lacks sufficient information and would have to embark on a fact-finding mission covering a period of decades in order to answer the questions put to it by the General Assembly. The Court notes in this respect that in the present case, over 50 States and international organizations have submitted information relevant to a response to the questions put by the General Assembly to the Court. It further notes that it has also reviewed a voluminous dossier submitted by the Secretary-General of the Â鶹APP, which contains extensive information on the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court considers that, in the present case, it has before it sufficient information to decide legal questions in a manner consistent with its judicial function. Consequently, there is no compelling reason for it to decline to give the requested opinion on this ground.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Whether the questions are formulated in a biased manner<\/strong> (paras. 48-49)<\/p>\nAs to the issue whether the questions put to the Court have been presented in a biased manner in that they assume the existence of violations of international law by Israel, the Court recalls, in the first instance, that it has the power to interpret and, where necessary, reformulate the questions put to it. It is therefore for the Court to appreciate and assess the appropriateness of the formulation of the questions. The Court may also, where necessary, determine for itself the scope and the meaning of the questions put to it. In the present case, the Court does not consider that the General Assembly intended to restrict the Court\u2019s freedom to determine these issues. The Court will ascertain for itself whether Israel\u2019s policies and practices are in violation of the applicable rules and principles of international law, before determining the legal consequences of any such violations. Consequently, the Court cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to give its opinion on the ground that the questions put to it are biased or imbalanced.<\/p>\n
*<\/p>\n
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there are no compelling reasons for it to decline to give the opinion requested by the General Assembly.<\/p>\n
II. G<\/strong>ENERAL CONTEXT <\/strong>(PARAS. 51-71)<\/p>\nBefore turning to the scope and meaning of the questions put to it by the General Assembly, the Court recalls the general context.<\/p>\n
Having been part of the Ottoman Empire, at the end of the First World War, Palestine was placed under a Mandate that was entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations. In 1947, the United Kingdom announced its intention to complete its evacuation of the mandated territory by 1 August 1948, subsequently advancing that date to 15 May 1948. In the meantime, on 29 November 1947, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 181 (II) on the future government of Palestine, which \u201c[r]ecommend[ed] <\/em>to the United Kingdom . . . and to all other Members of the Â鶹APP the adoption and implementation . . . of the Plan of Partition\u201d of the territory, as set forth in the resolution, between two independent States, one Arab, the other Jewish, as well as the creation of a special international r\u00e9gime for the City of Jerusalem. While the Jewish population accepted the Plan of Partition, the Arab population of Palestine and the Arab States rejected this plan, contending, inter alia<\/em>, that it was unbalanced.<\/p>\nOn 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence with reference to the General Assembly resolution 181 (II); an armed conflict then broke out between Israel and a number of Arab States, and the Plan of Partition was not implemented. By resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948, the Security Council decided that \u201can armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine\u201d. In conformity with this decision, general armistice agreements were concluded in 1949 in Rhodes between Israel and its neighbouring States through mediation by the Â鶹APP, fixing the armistice demarcation lines between Israeli and Arab forces (often later collectively called the \u201cGreen Line\u201d owing to the colour used for it on maps).<\/p>\n
On 29 November 1948, referring to resolution 181 (II), Israel applied for admission to membership of the Â鶹APP. On 11 May 1949, when it admitted Israel as a Member State of the Â鶹APP, the General Assembly recalled resolution 181 (II) and took note of Israel\u2019s declarations \u201cin respect of the implementation of the said resolution\u201d (General Assembly resolution 273 (III)).<\/p>\n
In 1967, an armed conflict (also known as the \u201cSix-Day War\u201d) broke out between Israel and neighbouring countries Egypt, Syria and Jordan. By the time hostilities had ceased, Israeli forces occupied all the territories of Palestine under British Mandate beyond the Green Line.<\/p>\n
On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967), which \u201cemphasiz[ed] <\/em>the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war\u201d and called for the \u201c[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict\u201d.<\/p>\nFrom 1967 onwards, Israel started to establish or support settlements in the territories it occupied and took a number of measures aimed at changing the status of the City of Jerusalem. The Security Council, after recalling on a number of occasions \u201cthe principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible\u201d, condemned those measures and, by resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, confirmed that<\/p>\n
\u201call legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, are totally invalid and cannot change that status\u201d.<\/p>\n
In October 1973, another armed conflict broke out between Egypt, Syria and Israel. By resolution 338 of 22 October 1973, the Security Council called upon the parties to the conflict to terminate all military activity and to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts.<\/p>\n
On 14 October 1974, the General Assembly recognized, by resolution 3210 (XXIX), the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinian people. By resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, it recognized \u201cthat the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the Â鶹APP\u201d.<\/p>\n
On 17 September 1978, Israel and Egypt signed the \u201cCamp David Accords\u201d, which led in the following year to a Peace Treaty between the two countries. Later, a peace treaty was signed on 26 October 1994 between Israel and Jordan. That treaty fixed the boundary between the two States according to the lines set under the Mandate for Palestine.<\/p>\n
On 15 November 1988, referring to resolution 181 (II) \u201cwhich partitioned Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish State\u201d, the PLO \u201cproclaim[ed] the establishment of the State of Palestine\u201d.<\/p>\n
In 1993 and 1995, Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo I and Oslo II Accords. In an exchange of letters on 9 September 1993, the PLO recognized Israel\u2019s right to exist in peace and security, and Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Oslo I Accord established general guidelines for the negotiations to be conducted between Israel and Palestine. The Oslo II Accord, inter alia<\/em>, divided the Israeli-occupied West Bank into three administrative areas (A, B and C) with Area C, which covers more than 60 per cent of the West Bank, being exclusively administered by Israel.<\/p>\nThe Oslo Accords required Israel to, inter alia<\/em>, transfer to Palestinian authorities certain powers and responsibilities exercised in Areas A and B of the West Bank by its military authorities and civil administration. Where such transfers, which have remained limited and partial, have taken place, Israel has retained significant control in relation to security matters.<\/p>\nFollowing an increase in acts of violence from the West Bank, in the early 2000s Israel began building a \u201ccontinuous fence\u201d (hereinafter the \u201cwall\u201d) largely in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. A plan of this type was approved for the first time by the Israeli Government in July 2001 and the first part of the relevant works was declared completed on 31 July 2003. Notwithstanding the Court\u2019s opinion in 2004, finding \u201c[t]he construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated r\u00e9gime [to be] contrary to international law\u201d, the construction of the wall continued, as well as the expansion of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.<\/p>\n
Reports indicate that, by 2005, settlers who had been residing in 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and in four settlements in the northern West Bank, were evacuated pursuant to an Israeli \u201cDisengagement Plan\u201d. By 2023, approximately 465,000 settlers resided in the West Bank, spread across around 300 settlements and outposts, while some 230,000 settlers resided in East Jerusalem. The residents of settlements and \u201coutposts\u201d in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (\u201csettlers\u201d) are predominantly Israelis, as well as non-Israeli Jews who qualify for Israeli nationality under Israeli legislation.<\/p>\n
On 29 November 2012, the General Assembly, recalling, inter alia<\/em>, resolution 181 (II), accorded to Palestine non-member observer State status in the Â鶹APP (resolution 67\/19).<\/p>\nIn 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution 2334 (2016) in which it urged<\/p>\n
\u201cthe intensification and acceleration of international and regional diplomatic efforts and support aimed at achieving without delay a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of the relevant Â鶹APP resolutions, the Madrid terms of reference, including the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet Roadmap and an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967\u201d.<\/p>\n
On 10 May 2024, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10\/23 in which it \u201c[d]etermines <\/em>that the State of Palestine is qualified for membership in the Â鶹APP in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the Â鶹APP and should therefore be admitted to membership in the Â鶹APP\u201d.<\/p>\nOn 10 June 2024, the Security Council adopted resolution 2735 (2024), whereby it reiterated<\/p>\n
\u201cits unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with international law and relevant UN resolutions, and in this regard stresse[d] the importance of unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority\u201d.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
III. S<\/strong>COPE AND MEANING OF THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE G<\/strong>ENERAL A<\/strong>SSEMBLY <\/strong>(PARAS 72-83)<\/p>\nThe Court then turns to the scope and meaning of the two questions posed by the General Assembly, and recalls their formulation. The Court notes that the questions define the material, territorial and temporal scope of the Court\u2019s enquiry. With regard to the material scope, question (a) <\/em>identifies three types of conduct which question (b) <\/em>describes as \u201cpolicies and practices of Israel\u201d: first, \u201cthe ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination\u201d; second, Israel\u2019s \u201cprolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem\u201d; third, Israel\u2019s \u201cadoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures\u201d. In this regard, the Court limits itself to observing a feature common to all of them, namely that the terms of question (a) <\/em>assume that these policies and practices are contrary to international law. By virtue of its judicial function, however, the Court must itself determine the lawfulness of the policies and practices identified by the General Assembly. The Court considers that question (a) <\/em>requires an assessment of the conformity with international law of those policies and practices of Israel identified in the request.<\/p>\nThe Court considers that, in its request, the General Assembly has not sought from the Court a detailed factual determination of Israel\u2019s policies and practices. Therefore, in order to give an advisory opinion in this case, it is not necessary for the Court to make findings of fact with regard to specific incidents allegedly in violation of international law. The Court need only establish the main features of Israel\u2019s policies and practices and, on that basis, assess the conformity of these policies and practices with international law.<\/p>\n
In terms of its territorial scope, question (a) <\/em>refers to \u201cthe Palestinian territory occupied since 1967\u201d, which encompasses the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The Court notes that the various Â鶹APP organs and bodies frequently make specific reference to the different parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court also does so in the present Advisory Opinion, as appropriate. However, the Court recalls that, from a legal standpoint, the Occupied Palestinian Territory constitutes a single territorial unit, the unity, contiguity and integrity of which is to be preserved and respected. Thus, all references in this Opinion to the Occupied Palestinian Territory are references to this single territorial unit.<\/p>\nThe Court further observes that the question mentions measures pertaining to \u201cthe Holy City of Jerusalem\u201d. The ordinary meaning of this term is ambiguous and may be subject to multiple interpretations, but the context provides useful clarification in the present case. In light of this context, the Court is of the view that the question posed by the General Assembly relating to the \u201cHoly City of Jerusalem\u201d is confined to measures taken by Israel in East Jerusalem.<\/p>\n
In terms of its temporal scope, question (a) <\/em>requests the Court to take account of measures adopted by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 1967. However, the Court is not precluded from having regard to facts predating the occupation, to the extent that this is necessary for the proper discharge of its judicial function.<\/p>\nThe Court notes that the request for an advisory opinion was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 December 2022 and asked the Court to address Israel\u2019s \u201congoing\u201d or \u201ccontinuing\u201d policies and practices. Thus, the Court is of the view that the policies and practices contemplated by the request of the General Assembly do not include conduct by Israel in the Gaza Strip in response to the attack carried out against it by Hamas and other armed groups on 7 October 2023.<\/p>\n
Question (b) <\/em>has two parts. The first part requests the Court to assess how the policies and practices of Israel identified by the General Assembly \u201caffect the legal status of the occupation\u201d. The Court observes that the use of the verb \u201caffect\u201d points to the possibility that such policies and practices may bring about changes to the \u201clegal status\u201d. However, the scope of the first part of the question depends upon the meaning of the expression \u201clegal status of the occupation\u201d in the overall context of question (b)<\/em>. In the present context, the Court is of the view that the first part of question (b) <\/em>calls on the Court to ascertain the manner in which Israel\u2019s policies and practices affect the legal status of the occupation, and thereby the legality of the continued presence of Israel, as an occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.<\/p>\nThe Court observes that both question (a) <\/em>and the second part of question (b) <\/em>call upon it to determine the legal consequences arising, respectively, from Israel\u2019s policies and practices and from its continued presence as an occupying Power in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. If and to the extent that the Court finds that any of Israel\u2019s policies and practices, or its continued presence, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are contrary to international law, the Court indicates that it will examine the legal consequences flowing from such findings for Israel, for other States and for the Â鶹APP.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
IV. A<\/strong>PPLICABLE LAW <\/strong>(PARAS. 84-102)<\/p>\nThe Court notes at the outset that the applicability of certain rules of international law in the territory concerned depends on the status of that territory under international law. The Court first seeks to ascertain the status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory under international law, and then determines which rules of international law are relevant for answering the questions posed to it by the General Assembly.<\/p>\n
The questions posed by the General Assembly are premised on the assumption that the Occupied Palestinian Territory is occupied by Israel. In its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory<\/em>, the Court set out the circumstances under which a state of occupation is established. The Court observed that, in the 1967 armed conflict, Israel occupied the territories situated between the Green Line and the former eastern boundary of Palestine under the British Mandate, namely the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Court affirmed that subsequent events had not altered the status of the territories in question as occupied territories, nor Israel\u2019s status as occupying Power.<\/p>\nIn its Wall <\/em>Advisory Opinion, the Court did not express a view as to the legal status of the Gaza Strip, as the construction of the wall did not affect the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip is an integral part of the territory that was occupied by Israel in 1967. Following the 1967 armed conflict, Israel, as the occupying Power, placed the Gaza Strip under its effective control. However, in 2004, Israel announced a \u201cDisengagement Plan\u201d. According to that plan, Israel was to withdraw its military presence from the Gaza Strip and from several areas in the northern part of the West Bank. By 2005, Israel had completed the withdrawal of its army and the removal of the settlements in the Gaza Strip.<\/p>\nThe Court notes that, for the purpose of determining whether a territory remains occupied under international law, the decisive criterion is not whether the occupying Power retains its physical military presence in the territory at all times but rather whether its authority has been established and can be exercised.<\/p>\n
Based on the information before it, the Court considers that Israel remained capable of exercising, and continued to exercise, certain key elements of authority over the Gaza Strip, including control of the land, sea and air borders, restrictions on movement of people and goods, collection of import and export taxes, and military control over the buffer zone, despite the withdrawal of its military presence in 2005. This is even more so since 7 October 2023.<\/p>\n
In light of the above, the Court is of the view that Israel\u2019s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel\u2019s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.<\/p>\n
The Court then turns to the rules and principles that are relevant for answering the questions put to it. These include the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by threat or use of force and the right of peoples to self-determination, which are enshrined in the Charter of the Â鶹APP and also form part of customary international law.<\/p>\n
Further, international humanitarian law is of particular relevance. Israel\u2019s powers and duties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are governed by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (the \u201cFourth Geneva Convention\u201d), which is applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and by customary international law. Pursuant to Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that Convention is supplementary to the rules contained in Sections II and III of the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to that Convention. As the Court has observed in its jurisprudence, the Hague Regulations have become part of customary international law, and they are thus binding on Israel.<\/p>\n
As regards international human rights law, the Court observes that Israel is party to several legal instruments containing human rights obligations, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965 (\u201cCERD\u201d), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966 (the \u201cICESCR\u201d) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966 (the \u201cICCPR\u201d).<\/p>\n
The Court recalls that \u201cinternational human rights instruments are applicable \u2018in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory\u2019, particularly in occupied territories\u201d. The Court further recalls that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict or of occupation. Some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may concern both these branches of international law.<\/p>\n
Referring to its Wall <\/em>Advisory Opinion, the Court observes that Israel remains bound by the ICCPR and the ICESCR in respect of its conduct with regard to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.<\/p>\nIn relation to CERD, the Court notes that that Convention contains no provision expressly restricting its territorial application. On the contrary, several of its provisions impose obligations on States parties that are applicable in territories under their jurisdiction or in relation to individuals within their jurisdiction. This indicates that CERD is also applicable to conduct of a State party which has effects beyond its territory. In the Court\u2019s view, Israel must comply with its obligations under CERD in circumstances in which it exercises its jurisdiction outside its territory.<\/p>\n
Several participants in the present proceedings expressed diverging views regarding the relevance of the Oslo accords signed in 1993 and 1995 by Israel and the PLO. On the basis of the interpretation of these Accords, the Court considers that they cannot be understood to detract from Israel\u2019s obligations under the pertinent rules of international law applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
V. I<\/strong>SRAEL\u2019<\/strong>S POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE O<\/strong>CCUPIED P<\/strong>ALESTINIAN T<\/strong>ERRITORY <\/strong>(PARAS. 103-243)<\/p>\nThe Court then assesses the conformity of Israel\u2019s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as identified in question (a)<\/em>, with its obligations under international law. In particular, the Court\u2019s analysis examines, in turn, the questions of the prolonged occupation, Israel\u2019s policy of settlement, the annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, and its adoption of related legislation and measures that are allegedly discriminatory. The Court appraises whether and, if so, how Israel\u2019s policies and practices affect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination after those other questions are considered.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
A. The question of the prolonged occupation <\/strong>(paras. 104-110)<\/p>\nWith regard to the question of the prolonged occupation, the Court notes that question (a) <\/em>concerns in part the legal consequences arising from Israel\u2019s \u201cprolonged occupation\u201d of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In this regard, the Court notes that Israel\u2019s occupation has lasted for more than 57 years. In order to answer this aspect of the question, the Court must turn to the relationship between Israel, as the occupying Power, and the protected population of the occupied territory, which is governed by the law of occupation.<\/p>\nBy virtue of its status as an occupying Power, a State assumes a set of powers and duties with respect to the territory over which it exercises effective control. In this context, the occupying Power bears a duty to administer the territory for the benefit of the local population. The nature and scope of these powers and duties are always premised on the same assumption: that occupation is a temporary situation to respond to military necessity, and it cannot transfer title of sovereignty to the occupying Power.<\/p>\n
The fact that an occupation is prolonged does not in itself change its legal status under international humanitarian law. Although premised on the temporary character of the occupation, the law of occupation does not set temporal limits that would, as such, alter the legal status of the occupation. Instead, the legality of the occupying Power\u2019s presence in the occupied territory must be assessed in light of other rules. In particular, occupation consists of the exercise by a State of effective control in foreign territory. In order to be permissible, therefore, such exercise of effective control must at all times be consistent with the rules concerning the prohibition of the threat or use of force, including the prohibition of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force, as well as with the right to self-determination. Therefore, the fact that an occupation is prolonged may have a bearing on the justification under international law of the occupying Power\u2019s continued presence in the occupied territory.<\/p>\n
It is against this background that Israel\u2019s policies and practices, as well as its continuing presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, must be examined. The Court then turns to these policies and practices, beginning with Israel\u2019s settlement policy.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
B. Settlement policy <\/strong>(paras. 111-156)<\/p>\n\n- Overview <\/strong>(paras. 111-114)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
Question (a) <\/em>posed by the General Assembly enquires in part about the legal consequences arising from Israel\u2019s settlement policy. The Court considers, in this regard, that the distinction that is sometimes made between \u201csettlements\u201d and \u201coutposts\u201d is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining whether the communities in question form part of Israel\u2019s settlement policy. What matters is whether they are established or maintained with Israel\u2019s support.<\/p>\nThe Court further notes that, between 1967 and 2005, Israel\u2019s settlement policy was carried out in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Since the removal of Israel\u2019s settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Israel\u2019s settlement policy has continued in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; the Court therefore limits its analysis to Israel\u2019s ongoing settlement policy in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. At the same time, the Court observes that Israel\u2019s settlement policy carried out in the Gaza Strip until 2005 was not substantially different from the policy that continues in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, today.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n- Transfer of civilian population <\/strong>(paras. 115-119)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
In its Wall <\/em>Advisory Opinion, the Court found that Israel\u2019s settlement policy was in breach of the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that \u201c[t]he Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies\u201d.<\/p>\nIn the Court\u2019s view, there is nothing in the terms or the context of the provision, or in the object and purpose or the drafting history of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to suggest that that provision prohibits only the forcible transfer of parts of the occupying Power\u2019s civilian population into the occupied territory. In the present case, there is extensive evidence of Israel\u2019s policy of providing incentives for the relocation of Israeli individuals and businesses into the West Bank, as well as for its industrial and agricultural development by settlers. There is also evidence that Israel regularly legalizes outposts that have been established in contravention of domestic Israeli legislation and that Israel\u2019s construction of settlements is accompanied by specially designed civilian infrastructure in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which integrates the settlements into the territory of Israel.<\/p>\n
In light of the above, the Court considers that the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel\u2019s maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n- Confiscation or requisitioning of land <\/strong>(paras. 120-123)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
The Court further notes that the expansion of Israel\u2019s settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is based on the confiscation or requisitioning of large areas of land.<\/p>\n
Observing that, in the present case, the public property confiscated or requisitioned for the development of Israeli settlements benefits the civilian population of settlers, to the detriment of the local Palestinian population, the Court concludes that Israel\u2019s land policies are not in conformity with Articles 46, 52 and 55 of the Hague Regulations.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n- Exploitation of natural resources <\/strong>(paras. 124-133)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
The Court next turns to the question of the exploitation of natural resources. It recalls that, under the principle of customary international law contained in Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, the occupying Power shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of natural resources in the occupied territory, including but not limited to forests and agricultural estates, and it shall safeguard the capital of these resources. Therefore, the use by the occupying Power of natural resources must not exceed what is necessary for the purposes of the occupation. In this connection, the Court observes that the occupying Power has the continuing duty to ensure that the local population has an adequate supply of foodstuffs, including water. Moreover, the use of natural resources in the occupied territory must be sustainable, and it must avoid environmental harm.<\/p>\n
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Court considers that Israel\u2019s use of the natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is inconsistent with its obligations under international law. By diverting a large share of the natural resources to its own population, including settlers, Israel is in breach of its obligation to act as administrator and usufructuary. The Court further considers that, by severely restricting the access of the Palestinian population to water that is available in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel acts inconsistently with its obligation to ensure the availability of water in sufficient quantity and quality. In light of its analysis, the Court also concludes that Israel\u2019s policy of exploitation of natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is inconsistent with its obligation to respect the Palestinian people\u2019s right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n- Extension of Israeli law <\/strong>(paras. 134-141)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
Turning next to the question of the extension of Israeli law to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court recalls that, under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the occupying Power must in principle respect the law in force in the occupied territory unless absolutely prevented from doing so. In principle, then, the law of occupation does not deprive the local population\u2019s civilian institutions in the occupied territory of the regulatory authority that they may have. Rather, it invests in the occupying Power a set of regulatory powers on an exceptional basis and on specific enumerated grounds.<\/p>\n
Based on the evidence before it, the Court observes that Israel has expanded its sphere of legal regulation in the West Bank. It notes, in particular, that Israel has to a large degree substituted its military law for the local law in force in the Occupied Palestinian Territory at the beginning of the occupation in 1967. Moreover, regional and local councils of settlers have assumed de facto <\/em>jurisdiction over the settlements in the West Bank. In East Jerusalem, domestic Israeli law has been applied since the beginning of the occupation in 1967 and Israel treats East Jerusalem as its own national territory, where Israeli law is applied in full and to the exclusion of any other domestic legal system.<\/p>\nIn the present case, the Court is not convinced that the extension of Israel\u2019s law to the West Bank and East Jerusalem is justified under any of the grounds laid down in the second paragraph of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Furthermore, the comprehensive application of Israeli law in East Jerusalem, as well as its application in relation to settlers throughout the West Bank, cannot be deemed \u201cessential\u201d for any of the purposes enumerated in the second paragraph of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.<\/p>\n
For these reasons, the Court considers that Israel has exercised its regulatory authority as an occupying Power in a manner that is inconsistent with the rule reflected in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n- Forced displacement of the Palestinian population <\/strong>(paras. 142-147)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
The Court then turns to the effects of Israel\u2019s settlement policy on the departure of the Palestinian population.<\/p>\n
The Court observes that the large-scale confiscation of land and the deprivation of access to natural resources divest the local population of their basic means of subsistence, thus inducing their departure. Furthermore, a series of measures taken by Israeli military forces has exacerbated the pressure on the Palestinian population to leave parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory against their will.<\/p>\n
The Court recalls that, under the first paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, \u201c[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive\u201d.<\/p>\n
In this regard, the Court considers that transfer may be \u201cforcible\u201d \u2014 and thus prohibited under the first paragraph of Article 49 \u2014 not only when it is achieved through the use of physical force, but also when the people concerned have no choice but to leave. Further, the Court notes that, to be permissible, evacuations are conceived as a temporary measure, to be reversed as soon as the imperative military reasons subside. By contrast, evacuations of a permanent or indefinite character breach the prohibition of forcible transfer.<\/p>\n
The Court considers that Israel\u2019s policies and practices, including its forcible evictions, extensive house demolitions and restrictions on residence and movement, often leave little choice to members of the Palestinian population living in Area C but to leave their area of residence. The nature of Israel\u2019s acts, including the fact that Israel frequently confiscates land following the demolition of Palestinian property for reallocation to Israeli settlements, indicates that its measures are not temporary in character and therefore cannot be considered as permissible evacuations under the Fourth Geneva Convention. In the Court\u2019s view, Israel\u2019s policies and practices are contrary to the prohibition of forcible transfer of the protected population under the first paragraph of Article 49, of the Fourth Geneva Convention.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n- Violence against Palestinians <\/strong>(paras. 148-154)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
The Court further notes that Israel\u2019s settlement policy has given rise to violence by settlers and security forces against Palestinians.<\/p>\n
Having examined the evidence before it in light of the relevant provisions of international law, the Court considers that the violence by settlers against Palestinians, Israel\u2019s failure to prevent or to punish it effectively and its excessive use of force against Palestinians contribute to the creation and maintenance of a coercive environment against Palestinians. In the present case, on the basis of the evidence before it, the Court is of the view that Israel\u2019s systematic failure to prevent or to punish attacks by settlers against the life or bodily integrity of Palestinians, as well as Israel\u2019s excessive use of force against Palestinians, is inconsistent with its obligations.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n- Conclusion on Israel\u2019s settlement policy <\/strong>(paras. 155-156)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
In light of the above, the Court reaffirms (see Wall <\/em>Advisory Opinion) that the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the r\u00e9gime associated with them, have been established and are being maintained in violation of international law. The Court notes with grave concern reports that Israel\u2019s settlement policy has been expanding since the Court\u2019s Wall <\/em>Advisory Opinion.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
C.\u00a0 The question of the annexation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory <\/strong>(paras. 157-179)<\/p>\nThe Court observes that the question posed by the General Assembly refers in part to the legal consequences arising out of Israel\u2019s alleged annexation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In order to respond to this aspect of the question, the Court must first analyse the concept of \u201cannexation\u201d. Second, the Court examines Israel\u2019s policies and practices with a view to determining whether they amount to annexation. Finally, the Court discusses the lawfulness of Israel\u2019s policies and practices.<\/p>\n
By the term annexation, in the present context, the Court understands the forcible acquisition by the occupying Power of the territory that it occupies, namely its integration into the territory of the occupying Power. Annexation, then, presupposes the intent of the occupying Power to exercise permanent control over the occupied territory.<\/p>\n
The Court recalls, in this regard, that, under the law of occupation, the control of the occupied territory by the occupying Power must be temporary in character. Consequently, conduct by the occupying Power that displays an intent to exercise permanent control over the occupied territory may indicate an act of annexation.<\/p>\n
The assertion by the occupying Power of permanent control of the occupied territory may manifest itself in a variety of ways. In this connection, the Court notes that a distinction between \u201cde jure<\/em>\u201d and \u201cde facto<\/em>\u201d annexation is occasionally made. Although differing in terms of the means through which the annexation is carried out, both types of annexation share the same objective \u2014 the assertion of permanent control over the occupied territory.<\/p>\nAgainst this background, the Court must examine whether, through its conduct, Israel establishes its permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in a manner that would amount to annexation.<\/p>\n
Having examined Israel\u2019s policies and practices, both in relation to East Jerusalem and to the West Bank, with a view to determining whether they amount to annexation, the Court comes to the conclusion that Israel\u2019s policies and practices, including the maintenance and expansion of settlements, the construction of associated infrastructure, and the wall, the exploitation of natural resources, the proclamation of Jerusalem as Israel\u2019s capital, the comprehensive application of Israeli domestic law in East Jerusalem and its extensive application in the West Bank, entrench Israel\u2019s control of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, notably of East Jerusalem and of Area C of the West Bank. These policies and practices are designed to remain in place indefinitely and to create irreversible effects on the ground. Consequently, the Court considers that these policies and practices amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.<\/p>\n
It is the view of the Court that to seek to acquire sovereignty over an occupied territory, as shown by the policies and practices adopted by Israel in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, is contrary to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations and its corollary principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force. The manner in which the annexation affects the legal status of the occupation, and thereby the legality of the continued presence of Israel, is discussed later in the advisory opinion.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
D.\u00a0 The question of discriminatory legislation and measures <\/strong>(paras. 180-229)<\/p>\nThe Court then examines the question of the legal consequences arising from Israel\u2019s adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures\u201d. Recalling the wording of question (a) <\/em>and the conclusion it reached with regard to the interpretation of the questions, it notes that it must itself determine whether the legislation and measures identified by the request of the General Assembly are discriminatory. In this regard, the Court first considers that it has to limit its analysis to legislation and measures that are closely linked to the policies and practices discussed previously. Second, the question covers Israel\u2019s legislation and measures only to the extent that they apply in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Third, the question is confined to the potentially discriminatory character of Israel\u2019s legislation and measures.<\/p>\nHaving thus defined the scope of question (a)<\/em>, the Court turns to the concept of discrimination. It considers that, common to all of the relevant provisions of international law is the concept of differential treatment between persons belonging to different groups. It observes, in this connection, that the existence of the Palestinian people is not at issue. Therefore, in the Court\u2019s view, differential treatment of Palestinians can give rise to discrimination.<\/p>\nIn order to answer question (a)<\/em>, the Court first examines the effects that Israel\u2019s residence permit policy in East Jerusalem has on Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court then turns to the restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Finally, it examines Israel\u2019s practice of demolition of Palestinian properties in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, both with regard to the practice of punitive demolition and demolitions for lack of a building permit. The Court notes in that connection that it is reported that almost 11,000 Palestinian structures have been demolished since 2009.<\/p>\nThe Court concludes from the evidence presented to it and on the basis of its analysis that a broad array of legislation adopted and measures taken by Israel in its capacity as an occupying Power treat Palestinians differently on grounds specified by international law. The Court notes that this differentiation of treatment cannot be justified with reference to reasonable and objective criteria nor to a legitimate public aim. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that the r\u00e9gime of comprehensive restrictions imposed by Israel on Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory constitutes systemic discrimination based on, inter alia<\/em>, race, religion or ethnic origin, in violation of Articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the ICCPR, Article 2, paragraph 2, of the ICESCR, and Article 2 of CERD.<\/p>\nThe Court further observes that Israel\u2019s legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel\u2019s legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
E. The question of self-determination <\/strong>(paras. 230-243)<\/p>\nHaving found that Israel\u2019s settlement policy, its acts of annexation, and its related discriminatory legislation and measures are in breach of international law, the Court turns to the aspect of question (a) <\/em>that enquires as to the effects of Israel\u2019s policies and practices on the exercise of the Palestinian people\u2019s right to self-determination. The Court has already affirmed, in its Wall <\/em>opinion the existence of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. In the present proceedings, the Court first determines the scope of this right and then examines the effects, if any, that Israel\u2019s policies and practices have on its exercise.<\/p>\nIn light of its analysis, the Court is of the view that the prolonged character of Israel\u2019s unlawful policies and practices aggravates their violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. As a consequence of Israel\u2019s policies and practices, which span decades, the Palestinian people has been deprived of its right to self-determination over a long period, and further prolongation of these policies and practices undermines the exercise of this right in the future. For these reasons, the Court is of the view that Israel\u2019s unlawful policies and practices are in breach of Israel\u2019s obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The manner in which these policies affect the legal status of the occupation, and thereby the legality of the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, is discussed later in the advisory opinion.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
VI. E<\/strong>FFECTS OF I<\/strong>SRAEL\u2019<\/strong>S POLICIES AND PRACTICES ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE OCCUPATION <\/strong>(PARAS. 244-264)<\/p>\nA.\u00a0 The scope of the first part of question (b) <\/em>and applicable law <\/strong>(paras. 244-251)<\/p>\nThe Court then turns to the first part of question (b) <\/em>on which the General Assembly requested its opinion and examines whether and, if so, the manner in which the policies and practices of Israel have affected the legal status of the occupation in light of the relevant rules and principles of international law. It begins by further determining the scope of the first part of question (b) <\/em>posed by the General Assembly.<\/p>\nIn this regard, the Court considers that the first part of question (b) <\/em>posed by the General Assembly is not whether the policies and practices of Israel affect the legal status of the occupation as such. Rather, the Court is of the view that the scope of the first part of the second question concerns the manner in which Israel\u2019s policies and practices affect the legal status of the occupation, and thereby the legality of the continued presence of Israel, as an occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. This legality is to be determined under the rules and principles of general international law, including those of the Charter of the Â鶹APP.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
B.\u00a0 The manner in which Israeli policies and practices affect the legal status of the occupation<\/strong> (paras. 252-258)<\/p>\nThe Court has determined that Israeli policies and practices and the manner in which they are implemented and applied on the ground have significant effects on the legal status of the occupation through the extension of Israeli sovereignty to certain parts of the occupied territory, their gradual annexation to Israeli territory, the exercise of Israeli governmental functions and the application of its domestic laws therein, as well as through the transfer of a growing number of its own nationals to those parts of the territory and impeding the exercise of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.<\/p>\n
The Court is of the view that Israel\u2019s assertion of sovereignty and its annexation of certain parts of the territory constitute a violation of the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force. This violation has a direct impact on the legality of Israel\u2019s continued presence, as an occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court considers that Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation. Nor can Israel\u2019s security concerns override the principle of the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force.<\/p>\n
The Court further observes that the effects of Israel\u2019s policies and practices discussed earlier, and its exercise of sovereignty over certain parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly the West Bank and East Jerusalem, constitute an obstruction to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination. The effects of these policies and practices include Israel\u2019s annexation of parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the fragmentation of this territory, undermining its integrity, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of the enjoyment of the natural resources of the territory and its impairment of the Palestinian people\u2019s right to pursue its economic, social and cultural development.<\/p>\n
The above-described effects of Israel\u2019s policies and practices, resulting, inter alia<\/em>, in the prolonged deprivation of the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, constitute a breach of this fundamental right. This breach has a direct impact on the legality of Israel\u2019s presence, as an occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court is of the view that occupation cannot be used in such a manner as to leave indefinitely the occupied population in a state of suspension and uncertainty, denying them their right to self-determination while integrating parts of their territory into the occupying Power\u2019s own territory. The Court considers that the existence of the Palestinian people\u2019s right to self-determination cannot be subject to conditions on the part of the occupying Power, in view of its character as an inalienable right.<\/p>\nIn light of the foregoing, the Court turns to the examination of the legality of the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
C.\u00a0 The legality of the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory <\/strong>(paras. 259–<\/em>264)<\/p>\nThe Court considers that the violations by Israel of the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force and of the Palestinian people\u2019s right to self-determination have a direct impact on the legality of the continued presence of Israel, as an occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power, through annexation and an assertion of permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued frustration of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, violates fundamental principles of international law and renders Israel\u2019s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful.<\/p>\n
This illegality relates to the entirety of the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel in 1967. This is the territorial unit across which Israel has imposed policies and practices to fragment and frustrate the ability of the Palestinian people to exercise its right to self-determination, and over large swathes of which it has extended Israeli sovereignty in violation of international law. The entirety of the Occupied Palestinian Territory is also the territory in relation to which the Palestinian people should be able to exercise its right to self-determination, the integrity of which must be respected.<\/p>\n
Responding to an argument made by three participants, the Court observes that the Oslo Accords do not permit Israel to annex parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory in order to meet its security needs. Nor do they authorize Israel to maintain a permanent presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for such security needs.<\/p>\n
The Court emphasizes that the conclusion that Israel\u2019s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is illegal does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law, particularly the law of occupation, towards the Palestinian population and towards other States in respect of the exercise of its powers in relation to the territory until such time as its presence is brought to an end. It is the effective control of a territory, regardless of its legal status under international law, which determines the basis of the responsibility of a State for its acts affecting the population of the territory or other States.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
VII. L<\/strong>EGAL CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM I<\/strong>SRAEL\u2019<\/strong>S POLICIES AND PRACTICES AND FROM THE ILLEGALITY OF I<\/strong>SRAEL\u2019<\/strong>S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE <\/strong>O<\/strong>CCUPIED P<\/strong>ALESTINIAN T<\/strong>ERRITORY <\/strong>(PARAS. 265-283)<\/p>\nThe Court has found that Israel\u2019s policies and practices referred to in question (a) <\/em>are in breach of international law. The maintenance of these policies and practices is an unlawful act of a continuing character entailing Israel\u2019s international responsibility.<\/p>\nThe Court has also found in reply to the first part of question (b) <\/em>that the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is illegal. The Court therefore addresses the legal consequences arising from Israel\u2019s policies and practices referred to in question (a) <\/em>for Israel, together with those arising from the illegality of Israel\u2019s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory under question (b)<\/em>, for Israel, for other States and for the Â鶹APP.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
A. Legal consequences for Israel <\/strong>(paras. 267-272)<\/p>\nWith regard to the Court\u2019s finding that Israel\u2019s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is illegal, the Court considers that such presence constitutes a wrongful act entailing its international responsibility. It is a wrongful act of a continuing character which has been brought about by Israel\u2019s violations, through its policies and practices, of the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force and the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. Consequently, Israel has an obligation to bring an end to its presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible.<\/p>\n
The Court further observes that, with respect to the policies and practices of Israel referred to in question (a) <\/em>which were found to be unlawful, Israel has an obligation to put an end to those unlawful acts. In this respect, Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activity. Israel also has an obligation to repeal all legislation and measures creating or maintaining the unlawful situation, including those which discriminate against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as all measures aimed at modifying the demographic composition of any parts of the territory.<\/p>\nIsrael is also under an obligation to provide full reparation for the damage caused by its internationally wrongful acts to all natural or legal persons concerned. Reparation includes restitution, compensation and\/or satisfaction.<\/p>\n
Restitution includes Israel\u2019s obligation to return the land and other immovable property, as well as all assets seized from any natural or legal person since its occupation started in 1967, and all cultural property and assets taken from Palestinians and Palestinian institutions, including archives and documents. It also requires the evacuation of all settlers from existing settlements and the dismantling of the parts of the wall constructed by Israel that are situated in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as allowing all Palestinians displaced during the occupation to return to their original place of residence.<\/p>\n
In the event that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons, and populations, where that may be the case, having suffered any form of material damage as a result of Israel\u2019s wrongful acts under the occupation.<\/p>\n
The Court emphasizes that the obligations flowing from Israel\u2019s internationally wrongful acts do not release it from its continuing duty to perform the international obligations which its conduct is in breach of. Specifically, Israel remains bound to comply with its obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
B. Legal consequences for other States <\/strong>(paras. 273-279)<\/p>\nThe Court then turns to the legal consequences of Israel\u2019s internationally wrongful acts in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as regards other States.<\/p>\n
The Court observes that the obligations violated by Israel include certain obligations erga omnes<\/em>, among which are the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self- determination and the obligation arising from the prohibition of the use of force to acquire territory as well as certain of its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law.<\/p>\nWith regard to the right to self-determination, the Court considers that, while it is for the General Assembly and the Security Council to pronounce on the modalities required to ensure an end to Israel\u2019s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the full realization of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, all States must co-operate with the Â鶹APP to put those modalities into effect.<\/p>\n
As regards the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force, taking note of the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly, the Court is of the view that Member States are under an obligation not to recognize any changes in the physical character or demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the territory occupied by Israel on 5 June 1967, including East Jerusalem, except as agreed by the parties to the conflict through negotiations and to distinguish in their dealings with Israel between the territory of the State of Israel and the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the Court considers that, in view of the character and importance of the rights and obligations involved, all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel\u2019s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It is for all States, while respecting the Charter of the Â鶹APP and international law, to ensure that any impediment resulting from the illegal presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the exercise of the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end. In addition, all the States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have the obligation, while respecting the Charter of the Â鶹APP and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
C. Legal consequences for the Â鶹APP <\/strong>(paras. 280-283)<\/p>\nThe duty of non-recognition specified earlier also applies to international organizations, including the Â鶹APP, in view of the serious breaches of obligations erga omnes <\/em>under international law. The obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the obligation to distinguish in dealings with Israel between the territory of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory apply also to the Â鶹APP.<\/p>\nFinally, the Court is of the view that the precise modalities to bring to an end Israel\u2019s unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is a matter to be dealt with by the General Assembly, which requested this opinion, as well as the Security Council. Therefore, it is for the General Assembly and the Security Council to consider what further action is required to put an end to the illegal presence of Israel, taking into account the present Advisory Opinion.<\/p>\n
The Court considers it important to stress, as it did in its Wall <\/em>Advisory Opinion,<\/p>\n\u201cthe urgent necessity for the Â鶹APP as a whole to redouble its efforts to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which continues to pose a threat to international peace and security, to a speedy conclusion, thereby establishing a just and lasting peace in the region\u201d.<\/p>\n
The Court also considers that the realization of the right of the Palestinian people to self- determination, including its right to an independent and sovereign State, living side by side in peace with the State of Israel within secure and recognized borders for both States, as envisaged in resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly, would contribute to regional stability and the security of all States in the Middle East.<\/p>\n
The Court emphasizes that its reply to the questions put to it by the General Assembly rests on the totality of the legal grounds set forth by the Court above, each of which is to be read in the light of the others, taking into account the framing by the Court of the material, territorial and temporal scope of the questions.<\/p>\n
*<\/p>\n