{"id":187278,"date":"1983-06-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-11T22:13:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=187278"},"modified":"2019-03-11T22:13:17","modified_gmt":"2019-03-11T22:13:17","slug":"auto-insert-187278","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-187278\/","title":{"rendered":"Living conditions of the Palestinian people – SecGen report"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n
\n

Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Palestinian territories<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Report of the Secretary-General<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

1.\t<\/span>In its resolution 34\/113 of 14 December 1979, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant Â鶹APP organs and specialized agencies, particularly the Â鶹APP Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a comprehensive and analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

2.\t<\/span>At its thirty-fifth session, after considering the Secretary-General's report (A\/35\/533 and Corr.1), which had been submitted pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution, the General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 35\/75 of 5 December 1980, took note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories and, in paragraph 4 of the same resolution, called upon all States to co-operate with Â鶹APP agencies, organizations and organs and local Palestinian authorities to alleviate the tragic living conditions of the Palestinian people caused by the Israeli occupation. Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive and analytical report to it at its thirty-sixth session, through the Economic and Social Council, on the progress made in the implementation of the resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

3.\t<\/span>At its thirty-sixth session, after considering the Secretary-General's report (A\/36\/260 and Add.1-3), which had been submitted pursuant to its resolution 35\/75, the General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 36\/73 of 4 December 1981, took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people and, in paragraph 6 of the same resolution, requested the Secretary-General "to prepare a comprehensive and analytical report on the deteriorating living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session through the Economic and Social Council".<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

4.\t<\/span>At its thirty-seventh session, after considering the Secretary-General's report (A\/37\/238), which had been submitted pursuant to its resolution 36\/73, the Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 37\/222 of 20 December 1982, took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and, in paragraph 8 of the same resolution, requested the Secretary-General "to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, through the Economic and Social Council, a comprehensive report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories".<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

5.\t<\/span>So as to enable the Secretary-General to prepare and submit the required report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, and in an effort to ensure a balanced and objective expert view, the Secretary-General used the services of a team of three experts: Mr. Dudley Madawela, formerly Co-ordinator of Units, Social Development Branch, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Â鶹APP, New York; Mr. Harald Kristiansen, Senior Research Officer, Norwegian Building Research Institute, Oslo, Norway; and Mr. Edward Balassanian, architect, urban designer and city planner, New York.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

6.\t<\/span>The experts were to prepare the report on the basis of material available from the Â鶹APP and its subsidiary bodies and from the specialized agencies, and other published and unpublished literature pertaining to the subject. They were also to gather information through visits to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the occupied territories and through discussions with government officials and others, as well as with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

7.\t<\/span>Since permission to visit the occupied Palestinian territories was not granted by the Government of Israel, the experts, in preparing their report, had to rely on secondary sources of information. Accordingly, from 11 February to 24 March 1983, the experts visited and had discussions with the relevant government officials of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Further discussions were held with Â鶹APP officials stationed in those countries. Discussions were also held with the relevant officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Damascus and Amman. Meetings were also held with five professors, who had been expelled from the universities in the West Bank in October 1982, the former Mayor of Halhul, the former Mayor of East Jerusalem, the head of the PLO Palestinian Fund, and with Palestinians now living outside the occupied territories, who had information on conditions within the territories within the territories either through recent visits there or from relatives living there. The experts also visited the King Hussein Bridge in order to obtain a first-hand view of conditions and procedures for crossing the Bridge and interviewed at random some of those crossing into Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

8.\t<\/span>The experts also visited the headquarters of, and gathered relevant information and data from ECWA, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNRWA, the ILO, UNESCO, and WHO. Various Â鶹APP reports dealing with conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories were also reviewed, particularly those of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the occupied Territories, the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979), of 22 March 1979, on the situation in the occupied Arab territories and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. A substantial amount of relevant material and information was gathered from those sources, which supplemented other information and data available in published documents of various other organizations of the Â鶹APP system that were made available to the experts and material published in books, periodicals and the popular press, as indicated in the various footnotes contained in the report prepared by the experts.i<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

9.\t<\/span>The report prepared by the team of experts is reproduced in the annex below.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

_____________<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span> * A\/38\/50\/Rev.1.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>** E\/1983\/100.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n
\n

ANNEX<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Report of the Team of Experts on the living conditions of the Palestinian people<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

in the occupied Palestinian Territories<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Chapter<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Paragraphs<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Page<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1 – 5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

II.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

6 – 19<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

III.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

PHYSICAL FACTORS:  HOUSING, INFRASTRUCTURE, LAND AND SETTLEMENTS, AND WATER<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

20 – 43<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

A.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Housing<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

20 – 27<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

B.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Infrastructure<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

28 – 32<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

12<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

C.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Land and settlements<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

33 – 38<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

13<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

D.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Water<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

39 – 43<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

15<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

IV.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

ECONOMIC FACTORS<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

44 – 97<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

18<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

A.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Economic framework<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

44 – 48<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

18<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

B.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Population and employment<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

49 – 53<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

19<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

C.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Income<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

54<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

19<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

D.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Aggregate income, gross domestic product and gross national product<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

55 – 59<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

20<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

E.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Disposable private income and wage-income<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

60 – 66<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

21<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

F.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Capital formation<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

67 – 68<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

24<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

G.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Consumption and savings<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

69 – 72<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

25<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

H.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Taxation<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

73 – 77<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

27<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

I.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Monetary situation<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

78 – 81<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

29<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

J.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Sectoral structure of the economy<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

82<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

30<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

K.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Sectoral structure of employment<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

83 – 84<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

31<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

L.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Agriculture<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

85 – 90<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

32<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

M.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Industry<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

91 – 96<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

36<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

N.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Other sectors<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

97<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

37<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

V.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

98 – 134<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

38<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

A.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Social and cultural conditions<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

98 – 111<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

38<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

B.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Education<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

112 – 124<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

41<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

C.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Health<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

125 – 134<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

44<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

APPENDICES<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

I.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Houses demolished, 1967-1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

51<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

II.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Population growth in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, 1979-1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

52<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

III.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Employed persons by economic branch in the occupied territories and in Israel<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

53<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

IV.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Employed persons of the occupied territories by selected economic branch and place of work<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

54<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

V.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Education in the occupied Palestinian territories<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

55<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

VI.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Consumer price index, West Bank and Gaza Strip<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

56<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

VII. <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Wage-income by sectors and location of employment, 1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

57<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

I.  INTRODUCTION<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

1.\t<\/span>The present report has been prepared in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37\/222, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to it at its thirty-eighth session, through the Economic and Social Council, a comprehensive report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories. It is a follow-up to the comprehensive and analytical report submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh  session (A\/37\/238),  pursuant  to  its resolution 36\/73 of 4 December 1981 on the "living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories".<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

2.\t<\/span>Considering that the occupied Palestinian territories comprise the West Bank of the River Jordan, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, the experts have endeavored to collect available data pertaining to the two territories. However, <\/strong>data in respect of East Jerusalem have been difficult to collect, because of the practice of the Israeli authorities of including them in the overall data for Israel. Consequently, information on East Jerusalem contained in the present report has been drawn from indirect secondary sources, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the former mayor of East Jerusalem and the mayor of Halhul, and other West Bank residents knowledgeable about the situation in East Jerusalem. The bulk of the analysis in the report is mainly concerned with conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

3.\t<\/span>In the absence of a visit to the occupied territories, it was not possible for the experts on mission to gather first-hand information on conditions there, particularly on such aspects as the condition of housing and public facilities, the state of the agricultural and industrial sectors, the practical aspects of education and the utilization of health-care services. However, much relevant information and data were gathered during the visit to the neighboring Arab countries and Â鶹APP institutions, offices and programs in the Middle East and at Vienna, Geneva, Paris and New York.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

4.\t<\/span>The present report analyses the changes that have occurred in those areas which have affected the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories. Chapter II gives a brief summary of findings. Chapter III deals with physical factors, namely, housing and physical infrastructure, land and water and chapter IV examines selected economic factors which affect living conditions. Chapter V deals with social and cultural factors recapitulating, in the process, information and findings pertinent to the issue under consideration contained in other reports submitted to bodies of the Â鶹APP system, particularly the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (A\/37\/485), the report of the Director-General of the International Labor Organization to the International Labor Conference at its sixty-eighth session in 1982, and the report of the WHO Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories submitted to the World Health Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1982. a<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

5.\t<\/span>In the preparation of the present report, the experts relied as much as possible on published sources, which were supplemented by interviews with people knowledgeable about the situation in the occupied territories. Conclusions in the summary of findings (chapter II) are documented and substantiated in the main body of the report.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

II.\t<\/span>SUMMARY OF FINDINGS<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

6.\t<\/span>The shortages of basic facilities in the occupied territories are quite evident from the data available. The number of new dwelling units built since 1968 is not adequate to alleviate the deterioration and dilapidation of existing housing or to meet the housing needs of the population.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

7.\t<\/span>Measures reported by the occupying authorities with regard to the provision of infrastructural facilities are not commensurate with the growing needs of the Palestinian communities in the occupied territories. There is a tendency to segregate services provided to Israeli settlements and Palestinian towns and villages in certain sectors, such as postal services, telecommunications, agriculture and industry. There is pressure on the Palestinian communities to obtain other services, such as water and electricity, from a common network serving the Israeli settlements as well as Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

8. \t<\/span>There is continual expropriation of land by the occupying authorities, and Israeli settlers have taken possession of blocks of private land adjacent to the settlements.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

9.\t<\/span>These expropriations have reduced the land available to the Palestinian residents to earn a living and improve their living conditions. The increase in the establishment of Israeli settlements and their location on the periphery of Arab towns and villages have become an obstacle to the growth and expansion of the latter.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

10.\t<\/span>The economy of the occupied territories, as measured by the real rate of gross domestic and gross national products, has improved. However, it continues to be handicapped by lack of long-term planning and programming designed to generate development for the benefit of the indigenous population. The trend so far has been towards further integration of the economy with that of Israel, thus exposing it to the high rate of inflation characteristic of the Israeli economy.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

11.\t<\/span>The disposable private income and the GNP per capita have increased in real terms, although the distribution of the income is not known. Private consumption as a\t<\/span>percentage of gross disposable private income has risen, and the percentage of savings has declined. As there are restrictions affecting investment opportunities, disposable income is channeled into the consumption and purchase of durable goods.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

12. \t<\/span>Capital formation has been low compared to that occurring in Israel and Jordan. Conditions existing in the productive sectors, combined with the unsettled socio-economic and political situation attributed to the occupation, has made capital investment risky for the local Arab residents. The only type of investment of any significance has been in improvements to existing private housing and, to a lesser extent, in new houses.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

13.\t<\/span>The level of taxation is proving a burden to the Arab population, particularly in the application of certain elements of the Israeli tax system which are not in consonance with the underdeveloped nature of the economy of the occupied territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

14.\t<\/span>Local employment has been falling in the agricultural and industrial sectors and rising in all other sectors, led by the construction industry more workers from the territories are commuting to Israel for employment, where their conditions of employment have not shown any appreciable improvement from past years. That almost two thirds of the actively engaged labor force is in one way or another working in and for the Israeli economy is a deterrent to initiating employment opportunities within the territories that would serve indigenous economic interests.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

15.\t<\/span>Agriculture in the occupied territories continues to be hindered by loss of land through continuing expropriation by the occupying authorities, lack of capital for improving production methods and shrinkage in markets. The agricultural sub-sectors which are expanding are the growing of vegetables and melons, the former finding a principal market in Israel. Melons are exported chiefly to Jordan. Further growth in those two sub-sectors will depend on the availability of irrigable land and increased allocation of water resources for agriculture, which at present is severely restricted.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

16.\t<\/span>The structure of industry has not shown any significant change over the year of occupation. It is dominated by small enterprises and a high proportion of those establishments are in sub-sectors which execute orders for Israeli enterprises,<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

particularly textiles and clothing, leather, wood and metal products. The industrial sector is handicapped by lack of capital for improvements in buildings and equipment, difficulties in importing new technology, export restrictions and competition from Israeli products.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

17.\t<\/span>Social and cultural conditions of the Palestinians living in the occupied territories have continued to deteriorate. The traditional family pattern is breaking down owing to pressures caused by incomes which are inadequate to meet escalating costs-of-living due to high inflation. The daily living activities of the Arab residents have been disrupted by frequent curfews, the ever-present possibility of confrontation with Israeli settlers in the occupied territories and restrictions in movement, association and expression. Culturally, they are deprived of many books and periodicals in the Arabic language. There have been a number of instances when actions by the Israeli settlers have interfered with their freedom of worship in such places as the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

18.\t<\/span>In education, although facilities at the school level have been keeping pace with increased enrolment, the content of education does not seem to be progressing along the lines that curricula are being developed in Jordan and Egypt. Many books, particularly in literature and the social sciences, are revised for or barred from use in the educational system in the occupied territories, which follows the Jordanian system in the West Bank and the Egyptian system in the Gaza Strip. The universities in the West Bank have had many setbacks during the past few years, including the dismissal and deportation of professors and new regulations affecting financial support from abroad. The closing of the universities in the wake of demonstrations and the frequent arrest and interrogation <\/strong>of students suspected of participating in them, together with the inability to obtain books and periodicals needed for research, have interfered with the quality of education provided by the universities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

19.\t<\/span>As regards health, the availability of hospital beds has not kept pace with the growth in population or the number of people seeking hospital care. Reporting of health data does not follow a uniform pattern for the occupied territories. New services have continued to be introduced in the hospitals in keeping with the policy of decentralizing specialist services to the district hospitals. Other measures and services related to environmental health, immunization and maternal and child care are being provided by an adequate network of clinics and health centers. The efficiency of the health care system continues to be hampered by limitations in equipment, qualified staff and distribution of drugs. Some of these shortcomings have been remedied to some extent through inputs from international organizations and local voluntary associations as well as the Red Crescent Society.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

III.  PHYSICAL FACTORS: HOUSING, INFRASTRUCTURE,<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

   LAND AND SETTLEKENTS, AND WATER<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A.  Housing<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

20.\t<\/span>There has been no significant change in the housing conditions within the occupied territories since the last report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (A\/37\/238, annex I, paras. 34 to 38). The main findings of that report are summarized below:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Supply of new housing disproportionate to population growth;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>A lack of institutional means of providing housing to the poor;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>A decline of housing stock;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>Overcrowded housing;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(e)\t<\/span>A shortage of basic utilities and sanitary facilities in houses;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(f)\t<\/span>Bureaucratic obstacles in transfer of funds for housing from abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

21. \t<\/span>With respect to basic housing facilities, table 10 of the report of the Secretary-General (A\/37\/238, annex, p. 17) can be updated as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 1. Selected basic housing facilities in the occupied territories<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

 (Percentage of families having the facility indicated)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n

Facility<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

1967<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1974<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1967<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1974<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Toilet<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

None<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

14.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

21.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

14.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

29.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

21.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 2.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Kitchen<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

None<\/p>\n

Shared<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

24.0<\/p>\n

 2.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

35.9<\/p>\n

 3.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

25.5<\/p>\n

 1.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

43.7<\/p>\n

 4.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

17.5<\/p>\n

14.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 3.6<\/p>\n

16.3<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Water<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Tap in courtyard<\/p>\n

Tap in dwelling<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

 9.9<\/p>\n

NA.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

17.0<\/p>\n

23.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

20.4<\/p>\n

44.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

27.3<\/p>\n

NA.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

61.5<\/p>\n

13.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

44<\/p>\n

51.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Electricity<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

None<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

76.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

54.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

18.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

81.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

65.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

11.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Bathroom<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

None<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

82.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

76.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

49.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

79.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

81.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

38.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>: For 1967 figures, see Bakir Abu-Kishk, "Human settlements: problems and social dimensions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (ECWA, March 1981), p. 7, and for 1974 and 1981 figures, see Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u> (Jerusalem, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1982), pp. 746 and 747.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

22.\t<\/span>Table XXVII\/31 of the Statistical Abstract of Israel 1982<\/u>, entitled "Area of buildings, by initiating sector and purpose", shows no activity by the public sector in residential construction since 1978 in the Gaza Strip and, since 1968, in the West Bank. However, according to the report prepared by the Office of H.R.H. the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan "…the Israeli Government has heavily subsidized settlement housing, which makes apartments there at least two thirds cheaper than their equivalent in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem". b<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

23.\t<\/span>Total residential construction, by initiating sector, is as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 2. Residential buildings completed, by initiating sector, 1967-1981<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(In thousands of square metres)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n\n

West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Gaza and northern Sinai<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Private<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Public<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

3,318.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   36.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

3,354.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,256.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   52.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1,309.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

\n

____________<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u> …, p. 766.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

24.\t<\/span>The table below compares the increase in the number of households with the increase in dwelling units:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Table 3.\t<\/span>Comparison of the increase in the number of households with<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

       the increase in the number of dwelling units, 1967-1981<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n\n

West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Population increase, 1967-1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

125,600<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

5,700<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Average family size, 1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

6.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

6.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Number of families increased, 1967-1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

18,203<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

14,500<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Total residential construction, 1967-1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

3,354,300m2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,309,500m2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Average size of dwelling units, 1979-1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

116.5m2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

132m2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Number of dwelling units increased, 1967-1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

28,792<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

9,920<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

\n

____________<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of<\/u> Israel, 1982<\/u> (Jerusalem, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1982),  table  XXVII\/1, p. 733;  table XXVII\/14, p. 7441 and  table XXVII\/12, p. 7671 and table 2 of the present report.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

25.\t<\/span>It will be observed that construction activities in the category of residential buildings in the Gaza Strip is 4,580 units short of satisfying even the need of population growth. In the West Bank, after satisfying population growth, construction over the past 14 years has only contributed a total of 10,589 units (less than 800 units per year) to decrease residential density and\/or to upgrade the housing standard. To illustrate further the insignificance of the present level <\/strong>of construction activities in alleviating the problem of substandard housing, it should be mentioned that by one estimate the current housing stock of the occupied territories is about 200,000 units, of which 70 per cent (140,000 units) is substandard and must be replaced. c<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

26. \t<\/span>While there are few dwelling units in the refugee camps that may be considered adequate, housing structures have been improved by refugee residents in the following successive steps:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Wood frame and corrugated sheet-metal walls and roof;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>Cement-block walls and corrugated sheet-metal roof;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>Cement-block walls and reinforced-concrete roof;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>Second floor addition.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

27.\t<\/span>In the Gaza Strip, the occupying authorities have only replaced those houses which have been demolished because of the construction of <\/i>security roads through refugee camps (a total of about 1,000 units). According to Palestinian sources, however, Israeli authorities have developed plans for several housing complexes outside and adjacent to the camps where they have subdivided the land into small residential parcels and offered them to the Palestinians under the following condition:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Recipient must be a refugee-camp dweller;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>He must vacate his camp residence;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>The camp dwelling has to be demolished and never reconstructed;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>Recipient has to pay the price of the new parcel; however, he receives a 99-year lease and not an ownership title.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Punitive demolition of housing by Israeli authorities has further reduced the number of dwelling units. The number of houses demolished from 1967 to 1981 is given in appendix I below.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

B.  Infrastructure<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

28.\t<\/span>Although progress has been reported in the provision of infrastructural services to the residents of the occupied territories in the supply of electric power, telecommunications and public transport, d<\/u>\/ the reported progress is in no measure commensurate with the needs of the residents of the area.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

29.\t<\/span>According to the report of the Government of Israel, electric power consumed in the West Bank was six times greater in 1981 than in 1968, and the increase was even higher in the Gaza Strip. However, according to the same report, 3 per cent of urban households and 27 per cent of rural households in the West Bank, and 11 per cent of the households in the Gaza Strip were still without electricity. e<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

30.\t<\/span>According to a report by Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, Israeli authorities in the process of locating and designing Jewish settlements in the West Bank, make sure "that the location of the settlements in fact restricts the physical expansion of adjacent Arab villages and farms as well as controls the high ground for security purposes". Moreover, one of the principles of designing road networks in the occupied territories is that "areas of Arab population should be circumvented, i.e., avoided". f<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

31.\t<\/span>According to the same source, Israeli planning and infrastructure is based on the concept of complete spatial separation between Jewish and Arab areas, and so far the following sections have already been either completely, or partially, separated:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Postal services<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(separated)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Telecommunications<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(separated)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Water<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(partially separated)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Roads<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(partially separated)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Electricity<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(partially separated)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Industry<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(separated, including differential tax and incentive systems)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Agricultural marketing<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(separated)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

School busing<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(separated)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Vehicle licensing<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

(separated) g<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

32.\t<\/span>The report prepared by the Office of H.R.H. the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan points to a highly disproportionate investment policy by the Government of Israel for Jewish and Palestinian localities of the occupied territories. h<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

C.\t<\/span>Land and settlements<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

33.\t<\/span>Agricultural land and water resources in the West Bank and <\/i>the Gaza Strip provide the major sources of livelihood, and therefore are of deep concern to the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. As mentioned in the previous report of the Secretary-General (A\/37\/238, annex I, para. 15), by September 1979 25 per cent of the total land area of the West Bank (1,500,000 dunums, equivalent to 1,500 km2) had been expropriated by the Israeli authorities. Of the expropriated land, 11 per cent was reported to have been allocated to a total of 123 Israeli settlements. Since then the amount of expropriated land has risen to 44 per cent of the total land (2,452,975 dunums, equivalent to 2,453 km2), and by February 1983 the number of Israeli settlements in occupied territories had risen to 139. i<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

34.\t<\/span>Distribution of cultivatable land in the occupied territories and type of their cultivation <\/strong>is as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t\t\t<\/span>Table 4.\t<\/span>Land resources of the occupied territories and<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>distribution in each region, 1980<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>(In thousands of dunums)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Total<\/u><\/p>\n

land<\/u> a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Total<\/p>\n

cultivable<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Under<\/p>\n

irrigation<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Under dry<\/p>\n

farming<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

West Bank<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

5,755<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,853<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 87.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,765.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Gaza Strip<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  369<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  193<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

102<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   91<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Total  <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

6,124<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

2,040<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

189.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,856.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n
\n

________________<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>: P. G. Sadler and B. Abu-Kishk, "Options for development: Palestine, Part I" (unpublished), pp. 30 and 31.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Note<\/u>: \t<\/span>1 dunum = 1,000 m2 = 0.25 acre (approx.)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/  These figures include grazing land, forests and idle land. The gazing land was estimated as 1.85 million dunums.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

35.\t<\/span>The practices of expropriation and confiscation of land by Israeli authorities, combined with their practices with regard to the use of water resources (see below), have resulted in a significant decline in the agricultural activities of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Various sources differ on the estimate of the total cultivated land appropriated for Jewish settlements. However, there seems to be a consensus that, since 1967, the decline of the amount of land cultivated by Arab citizens has been very significant. j<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

36.\t<\/span>Categories used by the Israeli authorities for expropriation of land in the occupied territories up to 1979 have been listed and discussed by the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem in a report presented to the American Enterprise Institute. Those categories have been classified as follows: k<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>"Absentee" property in respect of which the Israeli authorities act as custodian;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>"Registered State Domain": the occupying authority (Israel) replaces the previous Government, Jordan or the Jordanian King;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>"Land requisitioned for military purposes": land remains under private ownership. The Military Government pays for the use of the land. According to Benvenisti, many settlements have been built on these lands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>Lands closed for military purposes;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(e)\t<\/span>"Jewish lands": lands owned by Jews prior to 1948 and administered by the Jordanian custodian of enemy property;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(f)\t<\/span>Lands purchased by Jewish bodies (organizations);<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(g)\t<\/span>Lands expropriated for public purposes.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

37.\t<\/span>Since 1970, Israeli authorities have adopted a new policy based on the old Turkish Land Code, whereby any vacant land, such as mountains, rocky places, stony fields and grazing grounds, under certain circumstances can be considered mawat<\/u> (dead) land, and anyone who is in need of such land can, with the permission of the official, cultivate it on the condition that the ultimate ownership shall belong to the Sultan, to whom the Government of Israel considers itself to be a successor. l<\/u>\/ In 1968, the Military Government had already "temporarily halted" all title settlement procedures (Military Order No. 291). At that, time only one third of the occupied territories were "settled" by definition and entered into the Land Registry. According to Raja Shehadeh, m<\/u>\/ Israeli authorities, by means of the above-mentioned two instruments (the Turkish Law and Military Order No. 291) can virtually expropriate any piece of property they wish.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

38.\t<\/span>The report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session contains several references pointing to a distinct and comprehensive policy adopted by the Government of Israel for changing the ethnic, religious and racial composition of the population of the occupied territories to such an extent that, for all practical purposes, the Palestinians find themselves standing on much weaker and unstable ground in any future dispute and claim over territorial sovereignty (A\/37\/485, chap. IV, sect. 4). The evidence presented is mostly direct quotations from statements by high-ranking Israeli officials reported by either Israeli or international news media and agencies. n<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

D.  Water<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

39.\t<\/span>A report prepared by the Government of Israel, a shortened version of which was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (A\/37\/347 and Corr.1, annex), contains information on improvements in exploitation and distribution of water resources in "Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District". o<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

40.\t<\/span>Under the heading "Waterworks", the following activities were mentioned:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Three large wells were dug near Herodion, which increased the supply of water from 150 cubic metres per hour in 1970 to 700 cubic metres per hour;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>The Ramallah region received 70 per cent of its water needs from the Israeli system;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>Two new wells supplied five times more water to Jenin compared with 1970;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>In Nablus, a 200 cubic metre-per-hour well substantially alleviated the water shortage;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>Two new east-west pipelines in "Samaria" (West Bank) were laid to supply water to dozens of villages. The connection to initial villages was planned for the current year;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(e)\t<\/span>A 30 kilometre pipeline was being laid in the western Hebron Hill region (southern West Bank) to supply water to 10 villages. p<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

41.\t<\/span>With regard to water, the Palestinians object to the policies and practices of the occupying authorities related to the development of water resources by Palestinians and its distribution. These objections can be classified in the following groups:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Legal obstacles and problems of ownership of water resources;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>Inequitable treatment of Jewish and Palestinian residents of the area with respect to water distribution and usage.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

42.\t<\/span>Examples and evidence in support of the above objections are as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Legal obstacles<\/u>. Jordanian Law No. 31 on supervision of water, promulgated in 1953, required the approval of the manager of the Department of Irrigation and Water for any irrigation scheme. This was amended by Israeli Military Order No. 158, which provides that installations for drilling subterranean water (wells etc.) require a license from the Area Commander. The license has to be obtained for setting up, assembling or possessing and\/or operating a water installation. This has brought existing water operations within the jurisdiction of the Area Commander, who could, at his discretion, approve or disapprove water usage from existing installations. The Area Commander may refuse to grant a license without showing cause and may decide to cancel any license or to amend it or to make it conditional. q<\/u>\/ A method similar to that discussed above with regard to land own6rship and transactions has been adopted for water rights, according to Raja Shehadeh, who concludes as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t"The Custodian has claimed the wells and shares in water rights owned by non-residents. A prohibition similar to that for transactions in land is placed over the water rights making it illegal to transfer them without prior permission." r<\/u>\/\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>Inequitable treatment<\/u>. On the grounds of conserving water resources, which are indeed extremely crucial for the region in general and the West Bank and Gaza Strip in particular, Israeli authorities have devised various; restrictive regulations and practices, such as licensing, metering etc. However, there are scores of instances cited by Palestinians which point to the discriminatory application of those regulations in favor of Jewish settlements and to the detriment of Palestinians. For example, permission was refused to complete a well-digging project in the Saljet area of Nablus, and later Israeli authorities themselves completed it, but pumped the water to the Jewish settlement of Alqana. s<\/u>\/ Since 1967, Israeli authorities have thwarted a number of attempts by the Ramallah Water Board to create an autonomous water-supply system sufficient to meet the area's needs. At the time of the occupation, the Government of Jordan was nearing completion of a project to increase the water supply to Ramallah by digging new wells 12 miles to the west of Shibteen. With the occupation, the Israeli authorities ordered the termination of that project. In the meantime, the Israeli settlement of Kfar Shuba has received permission to bore new wells; for its own use. t<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

43.\t<\/span>According to Meron Benvenisti,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t"The impact of Israeli settlements on West Bank water is a function of the amount of land irrigated by the settlers and not of the actual number of settlers. Indeed the settlements today are 2-3 per cent of the West Bank population and use 20 per cent of the total water consumption of the area. Yet 96 per cent of this amount is for irrigation." u<\/u>\/\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Other statistics obtained from Israeli sources indicate that in 1977-1978 there were 314 Arab-owned artesian wells in the West Bank which discharged 33 million cubic metres of water, whereas 17 wells drilled by the Israeli Water Company to serve Israeli settlements discharged 14.1 million cubic metres of water. In other words, 17 Israeli wells discharged 30 per cent of the total water, whereas bureaucratic measures and economic factors prevented Palestinians from boring and utilizing similar wells. v<\/u>\/ As was stated in the previous report of the Secretary-General, only 30 out of 80 applications by Palestinians for permission to dig wells were approved (A\/37\/238, annex, para. 23). However, because of the high cost involved, amounting to a quarter of a million dollars per bore, w<\/u>\/ not even a single well was dug. There is no evidence that economic assistance programs to enable Palestinians to overcome those extremely high costs have been devised by the occupying authorities. At the same time, there are various prohibitive measures restricting the transfer of funds from abroad for development purposes, including water development projects. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities are approving and financing water-development projects for the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

IV.  ECONOMIC FACTORS<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

 A.  Economic framework<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

44.\t<\/span>A study of economic structure of the occupied territories necessitates some understanding of the environment in which the economic activities are taking place. The main feature of this environment is the systematic effort of the occupying authorities to integrate the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with that of Israel through such measures as monetary and taxation policies, employment, production in agriculture and industry and trade practices. The policies adopted and implemented by Israel have resulted in a high level of economic dependency of the occupied territories on the Israeli economy, including its inflationary trends, thus preventing the generation of conditions which, in the long run, could benefit the indigenous population.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

45.\t<\/span>The lack of economic planning and programming is another feature of the economic life of the occupied territories. This has especially, had an adverse effect on the development of an economic infrastructure that could sustain a process of self-generating growth in the territories. In a self-perpetuating manner, the paucity of opportunities for higher education and training in technical fields and in agriculture has become a constraint to future planning, programming and implementation capabilities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

46.\t<\/span>Moreover, the Palestinians have no control over the monetary and fiscal policies of the territories. They have no decision-making power on public expenditures and, therefore, are unable to influence the decisions or to monitor economic trends. This applies even to the local authorities whose budgets have to be approved by the occupying authorities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

47. \t<\/span>In addition to the general characteristics of the economy of the occupied territories, some technical problems make a meaningful analysis of this economy more difficult, among which are the following:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Inaccessibility to the civilian budget for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is subsumed in the budget for the Military Administration and considered classified and not available for public scrutiny;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>Non-availability of data on economic activities in East Jerusalem;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>Non-availability of any data and information, besides the revenues and expenditures, on the economic role of the municipalities, the highest form of self-government in the occupied territories;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>Unreliability of data and estimates used from Statistical Abstract of Israel<\/u>, 1982, the introductory note of which speaks of caution in this regard.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

48.\t<\/span>Under the circumstances described above, the best that can be attempted is to examine selected elements of the economy of the occupied territories, excluding East Jerusalem, and observe their behavior over a span chosen for the present report as a follow-up to the previous reports in order to determine the degree of change that has occurred.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

B.  Population and employment<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

49.\t<\/span>The population of the occupied Palestinian territories continues to rise, although at a lower rate than in previous years. In the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), it rose from 699,600 at the end of 1979 to 707,300 at the end of 1981. In the Gaza Strip, it rose from 431,500 at the end of 1979 to 451,600 at the end of 1981. The actual increases have been less than in previous years. In the West Bank, the actual increase in 1980 was 3,500 (natural increase: 20,600) and in 1981, 4,200 (natural increase: 20,000). In the Gaza Strip, the actual increase in 1980 was 10,500 (natural increase: 15,600) and, in 1981, 9,600 (natural increase: 15,000) (see appendix II below).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

50.\t<\/span>The difference between natural increase and actual increase is an indication of the level of emigration. Thus, in the West Bank, emigration amounted to 17,100 persons in 1980 and 15,800 in 1981. In the Gaza Strip, it amounted to 5,100 persons in 1980 and 5,400 in 1981. Those levels are much higher than in previous years, particularly in the case of the West Bank (see appendix II below and A\/37\/238, table 5).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

51.\t<\/span>According to the report of the Director-General of the International Labour Organization to the International Labour Conference at its sixty-eighth session in 1982, a significant characteristic of employment in the occupied Palestinian territories is that about one third of the labor force works in Israel. x<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

52.\t<\/span>Those Arab workers from the occupied territories employed in Israel continue to be disadvantaged in many ways with respect to their conditions of work in comparison with similar categories of Israeli workers. Employment is subject to a work permit, which has been extended up to six months for jobs in the industrial sector, which benefits only about 18 per cent of the employed persons in Israel. There seem to be special problems in extending this privilege to those working in construction and <\/i>agriculture (66 per cent of those employed) because of the seasonal or temporary nature of the work.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

53. \t<\/span>With regard to the trade union movement in the occupied territories, the ILO mission which visited the territories in November\/December 1981 made the observation that on the whole, the "movement does not seem to be very developed and its capacity to defend the workers' interest is still limited." y<\/u>\/ Only three trade unions were registered in the West Bank during 1981\/82.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

C.  Income<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

54.\t<\/span>There are generally two sources of private income for the people of the occupied territories: (a) income generated from economic activities of people living in these territories, and (b) income generated outside the territories by those Palestinians living and working abroad and remitting their incomes to their families back home. Both types of income are reflected in the national accounting for the territories. On the basis of available data, the following analysis to a degree of disaggregation feasible, are made on: gross domestic and gross nation product, disposable private income and wage-income and income generation by various economic sectors.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

D.  Aggregate income, gross domestic product and gross national product<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

55.\t<\/span>Data for the gross domestic product (GDP) and the gross national product (GNP) and their percentage changes over years 1975-1981 are shown in table 5 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 5. Gross domestic product and gross national product<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(In millions of Israeli shekels at 1968 prices)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1968<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1975<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1976<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1977<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1978<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1979<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n
\n

Aver-<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

age <\/u><\/span>b\/<\/u><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Gaza<\/p>\n

Strip:<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

West<\/p>\n

Bank:\t<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

GDP<\/p>\n

GNP<\/p>\n

GDP<\/p>\n

GNP<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

13.1<\/p>\n

13.1<\/p>\n

33.3<\/p>\n

34.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

22.9<\/p>\n

34.0<\/p>\n

65.6<\/p>\n

88.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

25.8<\/p>\n

(12.7)a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

38.4<\/p>\n

(12.9)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

77.4<\/p>\n

(18.0)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

101.5<\/p>\n

(14.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 27.2<\/p>\n

 (5.4)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 40.4<\/p>\n

 (5.2)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 74.8<\/p>\n

 (-3.4)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 99.8 (-1.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 27.3<\/p>\n

 (0.4)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 42.3<\/p>\n

 (4.7)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 89.2<\/p>\n

(19.3)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

116.5<\/p>\n

(16.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 30.7<\/p>\n

(12.5)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 47.1<\/p>\n

(11.3)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 83.7<\/p>\n

(-6.2)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

113.2<\/p>\n

(-2.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 29.7<\/p>\n

(-3.3)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 46.4<\/p>\n

(-1.5)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

106.6<\/p>\n

(27.4)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

135.6<\/p>\n

(19.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 30.5<\/p>\n

 (2.7)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 48.5<\/p>\n

 (4.5)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 98.9<\/p>\n

(-7.2)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

127.6<\/p>\n

(-5.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

(4.9)<\/p>\n

(6.1)<\/p>\n

(7.1)<\/p>\n

(6.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>All figures in parenthesis show percentage change over previous year.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>b<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Average annual growth rate 1975-1981.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

56.\t<\/span>The percentage annual changes in gross national product per capita for both territories follow the same fluctuation as was observed for the GDP and the GNP. The average annual growth rates of the GNP per capita for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank over the period 1975-1981, are 4.7 and 5.1 per cent, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

57.\t<\/span>On the average, both territories have enjoyed a reasonable rate of growth, well above the population growth rate, over the six-year period from 1975 to 1981. The GDP and GNP of the Gaza Strip grew at average annual rates of 4.9 and 6.1 per cent respectively, and those of the West Bank rose at 7.1 and 6.3 per cent.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

58.\t<\/span>The Gross National Product per capita at 1978 prices and the percentage annual changes for 1975-1981 are shown in Table 6 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 6. Gross national product per capita<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(At 1968 prices)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

1968<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1975<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1976<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1977<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1978<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1979<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Gaza Strip<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

36.4<\/p>\n

59.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 81.9<\/p>\n

132.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 90.2<\/p>\n

(10.1)a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

150.9<\/p>\n

(13.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 92.5<\/p>\n

 (2.5)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

146.5<\/p>\n

(-2.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 94.3<\/p>\n

 (1.9)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

167.7<\/p>\n

(14.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

107.2<\/p>\n

(13.7)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

160.8<\/p>\n

(-4.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

105.8<\/p>\n

(-1.3)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

191.2<\/p>\n

(18.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

108.0<\/p>\n

 (2.1)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

178.4<\/p>\n

(-6.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>All figures in parentheses show percentage change over previous year.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

59.\t<\/span> The percentage annual changes in gross national product per capita for both territories follow the same fluctuation as was observed for the GDP and GNP. The average annual growth rates of the GNP per capita for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank over the period 1975-1981 are 4.7 and 5.1 per cent, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

E.\t<\/span>Disposable private income and wage-income<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

60.\t<\/span>Data on gross disposable private income from domestic sources, transfers to private persons from abroad, gross disposable private income from all sources and the rates of their variations over the three-year period from 1979 to 1981 are shown in the table 7 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 7.\t<\/span>Disposable private income for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(In millions of Israeli shekels at 1968 prices)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Gaza<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

1979<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1979<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Gross national product<\/p>\n

(At factor prices)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

46.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 44.4<\/p>\n

(-3.9)a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 47.0<\/p>\n

 (5.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

108.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

131.6<\/p>\n

(21.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

125.0<\/p>\n

(-5.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Transfer from Government<\/p>\n

and local authorities<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

 0.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  0.5<\/p>\n

 (0.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  0.6<\/p>\n

(20.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  0.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  0.9<\/p>\n

(12.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  1.0<\/p>\n

(11.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Less income taxes and transfers<\/p>\n

to the Government<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

 2.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  2.5<\/p>\n

(-7.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  2.7<\/p>\n

 (8.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  4.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  4.4<\/p>\n

 (2.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  4.9<\/p>\n

(11.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Gross disposable private<\/p>\n

income from domestic sources<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

43.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 42.4<\/p>\n

(-2.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 44.9<\/p>\n

 (5.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

105.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

128.1<\/p>\n

(21.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

121.1<\/p>\n

(-5.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Transfer to private<\/p>\n

persons from abroad<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

 3.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  4.7<\/p>\n

(51.6)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  5.1<\/p>\n

 (8.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  7.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  6.8<\/p>\n

(-8.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  7.0<\/p>\n

 (2.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Gross disposable private<\/p>\n

income from all sources<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

46.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 47.1<\/p>\n

 (1.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 50.1<\/p>\n

 (6.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

112.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

134.9<\/p>\n

(19.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

128.0<\/p>\n

(-5.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>: Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>All figures in parentheses show percentage change over the previous year.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

61.\t<\/span>The gross disposable private income from all sources and from domestic sources has increased over the three-year period. The transfers to private persons from abroad have fluctuated in an inverse relation to the increase or decline of the gross disposable private income from domestic sources.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

62.\t<\/span>Wages constitute a high proportion of the aggregate income in the occupied territories. They include wages earned by workers in the territories as well as by those employed in Israel – about 35 per cent of the actively engaged labor force. Daily wage rates for workers in the territories and those employed in Israel, in 1981, are given below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 8.\t<\/span>Daily wages of employees working in the territories and in Israel by selected economic sector, 1981<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

 (In Israeli shekels)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n

Branch<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

In Gaza Strip<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

In West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

In Israel<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/p>\n

Agriculture<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Mining and manufacture<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Construction<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Commerce, restaurants and hotels<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Transport, storage and communications<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Public and community services<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Other<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 75.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 85.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

112.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 86.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

126.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 74.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 70.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 89.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

122.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 92.1 )<\/p>\n

      )<\/p>\n

 92.3 )<\/p>\n

      )<\/p>\n

108.4 )<\/p>\n

      )<\/p>\n

 80.8 )<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 76.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 99.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

120.4<\/p>\n

103.5 a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>An average for the four sectors, as the published data do not give figures separately.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

63.\t<\/span>An approximation of income through wages can be computed by relating these rates to the numbers employed in the various sectors in the territories and in Israel (see appendix VII below) and assuming a work-year of 240 days in the case of Israel and 300 days in the territories. z<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

64.\t<\/span>The total wage income based on this computation (see appendix IV below) in the occupied territories approximated IS 5.8 billion in 1981, or 35.4 per cent of the combined gross national product (at factor prices) of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Of this, almost IS 2 billion or 33.7 per cent was contributed through wages earned by the workers from occupied territories working in Israel. The significance of this phenomenon is that if, for one reason or another, employment in Israel ceases to exist, the economy of the occupied territories will be seriously affected.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

65.\t<\/span>The data concerning the sectoral composition of national income are not available. The only sector for which some data exist is agriculture. A summary of the income generated in this sector is shown in table 9 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 9.\t<\/span>Output, purchased inputs and income originating in agriculture<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(In millions of Israeli shekels at current prices)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Gaza<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

1978\/79 a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1979\/80<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980\/81<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1978\/79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1979\/80<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980\/81<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Output-Grand Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 192.3<\/p>\n

(100.0) b<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 392.7<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 953.3<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 536.7<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,716.4<\/p>\n

 (100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

3,107.2<\/p>\n

 (100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Purchased inputs<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  52.2<\/p>\n

 (27.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 120.6<\/p>\n

 (30.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 290.4<\/p>\n

 (30.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  95.7<\/p>\n

 (17.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  226.8<\/p>\n

  (13.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  611.0<\/p>\n

  (19.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Income originating<\/p>\n

in agriculture<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

 140.1<\/p>\n

 (72.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 272.1<\/p>\n

 (69.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 662.9<\/p>\n

 (69.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 441.0<\/p>\n

 (82.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,489.6<\/p>\n

  (86.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

2,496.2<\/p>\n

  (80.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>: Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel<\/u>, 1982.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

  <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>All figures in parentheses show percentage of Output-Grand Total in each<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

b<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Agricultural Year: 1 October-30 September.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

66.\t<\/span>The income originating in agriculture constitutes 72.9 per cent of the total output of this sector for Gaza and 82.2 per cent for the West Bank in 1978\/79, and has decreased for both territories over the three-year period, ending up at 69.5 and 80.3 per cent in 1980\/81 for the two territories, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

F.  Capital formation<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

67.\t<\/span>Gross domestic capital formation in Israel, Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as percentages of gross national product for the years 1968 and 1975 through 1981 is shown in table 10 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 10.\t<\/span> Gross domestic capital formation as percentages of gross national product<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1968<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1975<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1976<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1977<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1978<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1982<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Israel a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Jordan a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip b<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

West Bank b<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

23.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

16.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 8.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 7.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

32.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

25.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

19.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

28.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

27.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

21.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

20.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

25.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

31.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

20.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

20.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

27.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

31.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

20.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

24.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

24.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

32.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

29.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

NA<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

NA<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

19.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

19.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

\n

a<\/u>\/  Derived from International Financial Statistics<\/u>, International Monetary Fund, 1982.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

b<\/u>\/  Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

68. \t<\/span>Although the rate of capital formation in the occupied territories is high relative to those of many developing countries, nevertheless it is low in relation to the rates for Jordan and Israel. The contribution of Government to the development budget in capital investment is minimal. In 1980, the Government's input in the development budget amounted only to IS 50 million, or 11 per cent of the total. aa<\/u>\/ Capital formation has occurred in the housing sector through investment of private savings.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

G.  Consumption and savings<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

69.\t<\/span>Private consumption expenditure in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as shown in table 11, has risen, at current prices, from IS 2,395.5 million in 1979 to IS 6,012.7 million in 1980 and to IS 13,903.5 million in 1981. In terms of 1968 prices, the percentage increases have been 3.8 per cent in 1980 and 4.9 per cent in 1981 for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank combined.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 11. Private consumption expenditure<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(In millions of Israeli shekels)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

1979<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/p>\n

At current prices<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Gaza Strip<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

  694.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1 701.2<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1 716.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

4 296.4<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 4 052.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 9 851.1<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Total<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

2 395.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

6 012.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

13 903.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

At 1968 prices<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Gaza Strip<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

   38.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   39.0<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

    40.5<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Percentage change<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

   (0.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

    (3.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

West Bank<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

   92.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   97.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   102.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Percentage change<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  _____<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   (5.1)<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

    (5.3)<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Total<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  131.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  136.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   143.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Percentage change<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

   (3.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

    (4.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>:\t<\/span>Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

70.\t<\/span>The pattern of consumption expenditure for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are shown in table 12 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 12.  Domestic private consumption expenditure in agricultural and industrial goods,<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

and services as percentage of total for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Gaza<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1979<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1979<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Agricultural goods<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Industrial goods<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Services<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 24.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 50.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 25.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 23.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 48.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 28.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 26.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 42.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 30.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

 27.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 37.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 25.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 35.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 37.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 26.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 35.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 34.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 29.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel<\/u>, 1982.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

71. \t<\/span>Domestic private consumption expenditure on agricultural and industrial goods has decreased for both territories, while the same type of expenditure on services has increased over the three-year period 1979-1981.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

72.\t<\/span>As can be seen from table 13, the rate of consumption for the two territories combined has dropped from 78.5 per cent in 1979 to 77.0 per cent in 1980, to rise again in 1981 to 81.4 per cent. Correspondingly, the rate of private savings has risen from 21.5 per cent in 1979 to 23.0 per cent in 1080 and dropped to 18.6 per cent in 1981.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Table 13.  Consumption and savings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(In millions of Israeli shekels)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Gross disposable private income<\/p>\n

  from all sources<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Private consumption<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Savings<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Percentage<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Rate of consumption<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Rate of saving<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

3 052.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

2 395.5<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  656.6<\/p>\n

=======<\/p>\n

   78.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   21.5<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  100.0<\/p>\n

  =====<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

7 804.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

6 012.7<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1 791.6<\/p>\n

=======<\/p>\n

   77.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   23.0<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  100.0<\/p>\n

  =====<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

17 084.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

13 903.5<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 3 180.8<\/p>\n

========<\/p>\n

    81.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

    18.6<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   100.0<\/p>\n

   =====<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.\t<\/span>Taxation<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

73.\t<\/span>No comprehensive account of the taxation system in the occupied territories exists. Information from various sources indicates that the Jordanian system of taxation on properties and buildings, on income and on land still prevails, and it has been modified to conform to the Israeli tax system. However, new taxes have been imposed, the most significant of which is the value-added tax.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

74.\t<\/span>The only detailed account of taxation exists for the West Bank, as is shown in table 14 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 14. Income and taxation of towns in the West Bank<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(In thousands of Israeli shekels)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n\n

Budget years<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

1980\/81<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981\/82<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Income-Grand Total<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Taxes and fees – Total<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

178 511<\/p>\n

 (100.0)<\/p>\n

 22 639<\/p>\n

  (12.7) a<\/u>\/         <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

337 709<\/p>\n

 (100.0)<\/p>\n

 52 725<\/p>\n

  (15.6) a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Property tax<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Fuel tax<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

From fees<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  7 423<\/p>\n

  (32.8) b<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

  2 457<\/p>\n

  (10.8) b<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

 12 759<\/p>\n

  (56.4) b<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 19 458<\/p>\n

  (36.9)<\/p>\n

  4 845<\/p>\n

   (9.2)<\/p>\n

 28 432<\/p>\n

  (53.9)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Vegetable and fruit fees<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Slaughtering fees<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Industry, craft and building licenses<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Other fees<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  8 118<\/p>\n

  (63.6) c<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

    659<\/p>\n

   (5.2) c<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

    659<\/p>\n

   (5.2) c<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

  1 907<\/p>\n

  (15.0) c<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 15 859<\/p>\n

  (55.8)<\/p>\n

  1 597<\/p>\n

   (5.6)<\/p>\n

  6 285<\/p>\n

  (22.1)<\/p>\n

  4 682<\/p>\n

  (16.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>:\t<\/span>Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Taxes and fees-total as percentage of income-grand total.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>b<\/u>\/\t<\/span>As percentages of taxes and fees-total.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>c<\/u>\/\t<\/span>As percentages of "from fees".<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

75. \t<\/span>The total amount of taxes and fees collected, as a percentage of the total income of towns in the West Bank, has been 12.7 and 15.6 for the budget years of 1980\/81 and 1981\/82, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

76.\t<\/span>The property tax constitutes 32.8 per cent of the IS 22.6 million in taxes and fees collected in 1980\/81 and has risen to 36.9 per cent of the total of IS 52.7 million collected in 1981\/82.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

77.\t<\/span>The different type of fees charged by the occupying authorities make the bulk of the total taxes and fees at 56.4 per cent in 1980\/81 and 53.9 per cent in 1981\/82.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

I.  Monetary situation<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

78.\t<\/span>One significant result of the predominant trading activities between the occupied territories and Israel and the wages earned by the workers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip employed in Israel as well as those working in the territories on subcontract for Israeli enterprises, has been the virtual integration of the two economies, with the Israeli shekel as the main monetary unit of exchange. The Jordanian dinar continues to be legal tender in the West Bank and a preferred currency for holding by the residents owing to depreciation of the Israeli shekel, but its influence is diminishing with the reduction of trade with Jordan and other countries since 1981.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

79.\t<\/span>The table below illustrates the changes in the value of the Israeli shekel and the Jordanian dinar in SDR value since 1973.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 15.  Monetary exchange rates in SDR value a<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
\n

Year<\/p>\n

end<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Israeli shekels<\/p>\n

per SDR<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Jordanian<\/p>\n

dinars<\/p>\n

per SDR<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

Israeli shekels<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

per one<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Jordanian dinar<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Annual devaluation<\/p>\n

of Israeli shekels<\/p>\n

related to<\/p>\n

Jordanian dinars<\/p>\n

%<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

1973<\/p>\n

1974<\/p>\n

1975<\/p>\n

1976<\/p>\n

1977<\/p>\n

1978<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

0.507<\/p>\n

0.735<\/p>\n

0.831<\/p>\n

1.017<\/p>\n

1.869<\/p>\n

2.477<\/p>\n

4.657<\/p>\n

9.627<\/p>\n

18.163<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

0.397<\/p>\n

0.386<\/p>\n

0.388<\/p>\n

0.388<\/p>\n

0.388<\/p>\n

0.388<\/p>\n

0.388<\/p>\n

0.388<\/p>\n

0.388<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 1.277<\/p>\n

 1.904<\/p>\n

 2.142<\/p>\n

 2.621<\/p>\n

 4.817<\/p>\n

 6.384<\/p>\n

12.003<\/p>\n

24.812<\/p>\n

46.812<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  9.0<\/p>\n

 49.1<\/p>\n

 12.5<\/p>\n

 22.4<\/p>\n

 83.8<\/p>\n

 32.5<\/p>\n

 88.0<\/p>\n

106.7<\/p>\n

 88.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  International Financial Statistics,-International Monetary Fund, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>SDR is a calculated "dollar" value taking into account the changes in exchange rate regimes, that is, from the par value period of floating exchange rates.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

80.\t<\/span>There  has  been a further fall in the value of the Israeli shekel subsequent to 1981. bb<\/u>\/ At the same time, the inflation in the Israeli economy of more than 100 per cent per annum during the past few years has further eroded the value of the shekel. The mere recovery of the real value of money on loan or in savings would require an annual interest rate of more than 100 per cent, causing all transactions in business, production credits, investments and savings a hazardous undertaking.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

81.\t<\/span>Branches of Israeli banks dealing mainly in Israeli shekels constitute the monetary market in the occupied territories and continue to provide the credit requirements of the Palestinian entrepreneurs. However, they have not been utilized to any great extent, except for current transactions with Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

J.  Sectoral structure of the economy<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

82. \t<\/span>The lack of data about the sectoral activities of the occupied territories does not allow any meaningful analysis of the prevailing conditions.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

K.  Sectoral structure of employment<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

83.\t<\/span>The data on employment by sector available for the West Bank and Gaza Strip are shown in table 16.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 16.  Employment by sector<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Gaza<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

diff.<\/p>\n

81-79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

diff.<\/p>\n

81-79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Total- '000<\/p>\n

– percentages()<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  79.6<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  80.9<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  82.5<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 2.9<\/p>\n

-2.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 132.8<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 134.8<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 133.4<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  0.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Agriculture, forestry<\/p>\n

  and fishing<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

 16.2<\/p>\n

(20.4)a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  15.0<\/p>\n

 (18.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  14.2<\/p>\n

 (17.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

-2.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  33.6<\/p>\n

 (25.3)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

  35.3<\/p>\n

 (26.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  32.2<\/p>\n

 (24.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 -1.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Industry (mining and<\/p>\n

  manufacturing)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

  15.8<\/p>\n

 (19.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  15.8<\/p>\n

 (19.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  14.2<\/p>\n

 (17.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

-1.6<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  24.3<\/p>\n

 (18.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  22.8<\/p>\n

 (16.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  21.9<\/p>\n

 (16.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 -2.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Construction (bldg.<\/p>\n

  of public works)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

  18.3<\/p>\n

 (23.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  18.7<\/p>\n

 (23.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  21.9<\/p>\n

 (26.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 3.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  30.0<\/p>\n

 (22.6)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  30.5<\/p>\n

 (22.6)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  32.0<\/p>\n

 (24.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  2.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Commerce, restaurants<\/p>\n

  and hotels<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

  10.0<\/p>\n

 (12.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  11.3<\/p>\n

 (14.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  11.7<\/p>\n

 (14.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 1.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  16.9<\/p>\n

 (12.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  17.1<\/p>\n

 (12.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  16.6<\/p>\n

 (12.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 -0.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Transport, storage<\/p>\n

  and commerce<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

   5.1<\/p>\n

  (6.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   5.3<\/p>\n

  (6.6)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   5.6<\/p>\n

  (6.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 0.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

   5.8<\/p>\n

  (4.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   6.1<\/p>\n

  (4.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   6.5<\/p>\n

  (4.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  0.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Public and community<\/p>\n

  services<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

   9.6<\/p>\n

 (12.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  10.5<\/p>\n

 (13.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  10.6<\/p>\n

 (12.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 1.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  17.0<\/p>\n

 (12.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  17.9<\/p>\n

 (13.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  19.0<\/p>\n

 (14.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  2.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Other<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   4.6<\/p>\n

  (5.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   4.3<\/p>\n

  (5.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   4.3<\/p>\n

  (5.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

-0.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

   5.2<\/p>\n

  (3.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   5.1<\/p>\n

  (3.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   5.2<\/p>\n

  (3.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  0.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:\t<\/span> Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>All figures in parentheses show percentages of the total for each year.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

84.\t<\/span>There is a marked resemblance between the sectoral structure of employment in the Gaza and the West Bank. The importance of both territories' agricultural sector as a primary employer of the labor force is diminishing. From 1979 to 1981, the share of that sector in employment was reduced by 3.1 and 2.4 percentage points for the Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. The industrial sector also lost its share of employment within the same period by 2.6 per cent for the Gaza Strip and 1.9 per cent for the West Bank. The rest of the sectors raised their share of employment, construction leading with 3.5 per cent for the Gaza and 1.4 per cent for the West Bank. All the changes show further reliance of the territories' economy on the economic life of Israel, at the employment opportunities decline in the vital sectors of the economy, that, is, agricultural and industry, non-productive and services sector tend to employ a higher percentage of the labor force.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

L.\t<\/span>Agriculture<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

85.\t<\/span>Table 17 summarizes the activities of the agricultural sector in broad categories:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 17. Output in agriculture<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(in millions of Israeli shekels)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Gaza<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1978\/79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1979\/80<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980\/81<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1978\/79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1979\/80<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980\/81<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Output – Grand Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

192.3<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 392.7<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 953.3<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 536.7<\/p>\n

(100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1,761.4<\/p>\n

 (100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

3,107.2<\/p>\n

 (100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Crops – Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 144.8<\/p>\n

 (75.3)a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   294.9<\/p>\n

   (75.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   693.4<\/p>\n

   (72.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

   326.3<\/p>\n

  (100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1,277.7<\/p>\n

 (100.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1,886.8<\/p>\n

  (60.7)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

 Livestock and<\/p>\n

  livestock products<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  47.5<\/p>\n

 (24.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

    97.8<\/p>\n

   (24.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

   259.9<\/p>\n

   (27.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

   210.4<\/p>\n

   (39.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  438.7<\/p>\n

  (25.6)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1,220.4<\/p>\n

  (39.3)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>All figures in parentheses show percentages of the output-Grand total for each agricultural year.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

86.\t<\/span>The percentage of crop production to the total output of the agricultural sector has decreased over the three-agricultural-calendar-year period for the Gaza Strip, but it rose for the West Bank in 1979\/80 by 13.6 per cent to the 74.4 percentage level, to fall back again to almost the same percentage in 1978\/79. In the livestock and livestock products, there has been a reciprocal trend, that is, an increased share in the total output for the Gaza strip and keeping to almost the same level of 39.2 and 39.3 percentage points for 1978\/79 and 1980\/81 for the West Bank. Crop production, even with its declining percentage in 1980\/81, still constitutes an output more than 2.6 times the output derived from livestock and livestock products for the Gaza Strip. The same proportion for the West Bank is only 1.5 times the output.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

87.\t<\/span>Agriculture in the West Bank is characterized by a high proportion of small farms, mainly for dry farming, amounting to about 1.77 million dunums with only about 88,000 dunums under irrigation. In the Gaza Strip, of the total cultivatable land amounting to about 193,000 dunums, about 102,000 dunums are under irrigation devoted mostly to citrus cultivation. Data on agricultural output in the two territories during the years 1978\/1979 to 1980\/1981 are given in the table below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 18. Agricultural production in the West Bank and Gaza Strip<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(Thousand tons)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Table 16.  Employment by sector<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

Gaza<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1978\/79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1979\/80<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980\/81<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1978\/79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1979\/80<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980\/81<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Field crops<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 33.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

  42.5<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

 (28.0)<\/span>a<\/u><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  41.2<\/p>\n

 (-3.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Vegetables and<\/p>\n

  potatoes<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 51.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  60.0<\/p>\n

 (16.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  72.3<\/p>\n

 (20.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

140.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 145.4<\/p>\n

  (3.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 159.5<\/p>\n

  (9.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Melons and<\/p>\n

   pumpkins<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  3.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   4.3<\/p>\n

 (19.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   4.6<\/p>\n

  (7.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

  8.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  19.6<\/p>\n

(145.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  42.7<\/p>\n

(117.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Olives<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 21.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 120.0<\/p>\n

(468.7)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  45.0<\/p>\n

(-62.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Citrus<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

192.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 171.5<\/p>\n

(-10.8)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 179.3<\/p>\n

  (4.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 79.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  74.3<\/p>\n

 (-6.1)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  73.5<\/p>\n

 (-1.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Other fruit<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 18.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  21.4<\/p>\n

 (13.2)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  20.8<\/p>\n

 (-2.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 87.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  85.9<\/p>\n

 (-1.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 105.9<\/p>\n

 (23.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Meat<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  4.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   5.6<\/p>\n

 (16.7)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   6.2<\/p>\n

 (10.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 23.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  23.1<\/p>\n

 (-1.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  25.7<\/p>\n

 (11.3)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Milk<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 15.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  14.7<\/p>\n

 (-5.2)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  13.9<\/p>\n

 (-5.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 39.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 36.7<\/p>\n

(-6.8)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  38.8<\/p>\n

  (5.7)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Fish<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  1.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   1.2<\/p>\n

(-20)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

   1.4<\/p>\n

 (16.7)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

–<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

–<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

 Eggs (million)<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 47.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  42.8<\/p>\n

 (-9.9)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  45.6<\/p>\n

  (6.5)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

 44.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 44.5<\/p>\n

 (0.0)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  50.0<\/p>\n

 (12.4)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>All figures in parentheses show percentage change over previous year.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

88.\t<\/span>Agricultural production over the three-year period has shown a considerable degree of fluctuation most possibly owing to climatic conditions. As most of the farm products are cultivated under dry farming conditions, weather conditions play an important role in productivity. On the other hand, those crops grown largely on irrigated land, namely, vegetables and melons, show significant increases in output.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

89.\t<\/span>More than 43 per cent of the vegetable crop of 1980\/81 was exported to the Israeli market for processing or export. The main market for melons and pumpkins is Jordan, to which almost 48 per cent of the crop of 1980\/81 was exported. The flow of trade in the supply of fruit and vegetables in the West Bank in 1980\/81 is given in table 19 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 19.  Supply of fruit and vegetables in the West Bank by source and disposal, 1980\/81<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

 (thousand tons)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Disposal<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

Source<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Gaza<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Israel<\/p>\n

and<\/p>\n

export<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Jordan<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Local<\/p>\n

con-<\/p>\n

sumption<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Gaza<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Israel<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Local<\/p>\n

produc-<\/p>\n

tion<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

TOTAL<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

5.3<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

99.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

103.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

262.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

26.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

61.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

381.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

470.4<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Fruit<\/p>\n

 (excl.<\/p>\n

 olives)<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Vegetables<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Melons and<\/p>\n

 pumpkins<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

5.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

0.2<\/p>\n

 –<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

23.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

68.8<\/p>\n

 7.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 65.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 18.7<\/p>\n

 19.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

115.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

114.4<\/p>\n

 33.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

 7.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

19.0<\/p>\n

 0.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

22.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

23.6<\/p>\n

16.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

179.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

159.5<\/p>\n

 42.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

209.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

202.1<\/p>\n

 59.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

90.\t<\/span>The agricultural sector in the territories continues to operate under many disadvantages, including loss of cultivatable land through confiscation and closure" for military and other purposes, restrictions in the use of water for agricultural purposes, shortage of capital for investment, and inability of Arab farms to compete with Israeli enterprises, including the settlements in the occupied territories. Export constraints have further diminished the profitability of agriculture in the occupied territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

M.  Industry<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

91.\t<\/span>Owing to lack of data comparable to that available in the agricultural sector, the type of analysis in the industrial sector would be different from what was chosen in analyzing the structure of the agricultural sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

92.\t<\/span>The structure of industry has not shown any significant change over the years of occupation. It is still characterized by small firms, low capitalization, low level of technology and a preponderance of manually operated machinery and equipment. There has been a sharp drop in the number of establishments in the West Bank, from 4,029 in 1969 to 2,206 in 1979. cc<\/u>\/ The distribution of establishments by groups and level of employment is shown in table 20 below:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 20.  Distribution of establishments in the West Bank by major groups and level of employment, 1979<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

Distribution by level of employment<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

Major groups<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

2-3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

4-7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

8-10<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

11-20<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

21+<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

persons<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/p>\n

Food, beverages and tobacco<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Textiles and clothing<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Leather and its products<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Wood and its products<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Rubber, plastic and chemical<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Non-metallic minerals<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Basic metals and metal products<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Other industrial products<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  232<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  484<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  234<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  437<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   51<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  122<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  419<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  227<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 85<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

132<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 62<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

160<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

  4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 57<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 79<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 61<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

170<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

117<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

205<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 14<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 32<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

236<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 85<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 65<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

107<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 52<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 59<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 11<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 63<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

117<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 44<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

26<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

11<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

10<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

40<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

10<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

10<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 –<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 –<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

12<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 3<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

2,206<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

585<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

920<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

518<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

71<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

76<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

37<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>:  E\/ECWA\/UNIDO\/WP.l (1981), p. 18, table 7.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

93.\t<\/span>The data indicate that most of the enterprises are small-scale establishments; 68 per cent of the establishments employ one to three persons, while another 23 per cent employ four to seven persons. The number of establishments employing more than 21 persons is less than 2 per cent. The structure is not very different in the Gaza Strip. Of the 1,334 establishments there in 1979, 62.1 per cent employed three or fewer persons, while another 25.7 per cent employed four to seven persons. The number of establishments employing more than 21 was 2.2 per cent. dd<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

94.\t<\/span>Taking both territories together, it is observed that enterprises engaged in production of textiles and clothing, wood and its products, basic metals and metal products, and leather and its products dominate the industrial structure. Establishments engaged in food, beverages and tobacco mainly supply the local market with some specialized items, such as soap and processed olive oil for export to Jordan. <\/strong>However, exports to Jordan, and through it to other Arab countries, are limited by the requirement that the raw material used in the manufacture should originate in the occupied territories. This requirement creates serious problems, since, according to the ECWA\/UNIDO survey undertaken in 1980, between 70 per cent and 100 per cent of all raw materials used in manufacturing processes in the West Bank and the <\/strong>Gaza Strip are imported from or through Israel, except in the food, beverages, printing <\/strong>and publishing industries in the West Bank. The Gaza Strip relies most heavily on raw materials imported from Israel because of the extreme scarcity of local raw materials. ee<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

95.\t<\/span>Industrialists in the occupied territories face the problem of mobilizing adequate finances to improve their establishments and to modernize production methods. Most of them have had to rely on private initiative or partnership financing. Only about 3 per cent of the establishments in the random sample undertaken in the ECWA\/UNIDO survey had obtained loans from banks. ff<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

96.\t<\/span>Apart from the problem of financing, other problems faced by industrialists in the occupied territories include difficulty in obtaining permits to import manufacturing equipment from abroad because of delays or refusals by the occupying authorities to issue such permits. Furthermore, the authorities are reluctant to permit the establishment of new facilities. It was reported that permission to build a cement factory, a factory for batteries and another for the extraction of citrus juice had been refused. A recent PLO economic report mentioned that the purchase of a private, Israeli-owned existing juice-extracting unit to process unsold oranges had been refused. gg<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

N.\t<\/span>Other sectors<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

97.\t<\/span>As in other production sectors, there is no long-term planning and programming to reorganize and vitalize the industrial sectors to respond to the demand for industrial products by residents of the occupied territories or to develop an export market for the products. This situation is likely to prevail as long as the indigenous leadership in the industrial sector is excluded from directing industrial development and as long as no local institutions are available to meet the technological, commercial and financial needs of those sectors.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

V.  SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

  A.\t<\/span>Social and cultural conditions<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

98.\t<\/span>Policies and practices of the occupying Power embodied in various military orders, amounting to more than 975 since the occupation, have brought about many changes in the life style of the Palestinian families living in the occupied territories. Restrictions in the use of water for agricultural purposes and the frequent expropriation of land, both private and public, have evoked a sense of deep insecurity and a disincentive to pursue the traditional rural-agricultural mode of life. Some family members have had to seek wage employment, particularly in the Israeli economy or in nearby Israeli settlements, while others have obtained employment in the Gulf States and other countries.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

99. \t<\/span>Where the wage earners live in the family household, as is customary in Palestinian society, their contributions towards the upkeep of the home, together with remittances from abroad, have enabled the head of the household to retain his land mainly as a means of family security rather than a productive asset. Where there is no outside income to support the family household, the head has had to seek employment himself, thereby neglecting the family farm. Sometimes he has had to sell the land. Since 1979, this has been facilitated through the policy of the occupying Power which legalizes the purchase of private land in the occupied territories by Israeli firms and individuals. For instance, it was reported that 15,000 dunums of Arab land in the West Bank had been purchased by an Israeli company for the construction of Israeli housing (A\/37\/485, para. 178).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

100. \t<\/span>Actions amounting to harassment of farmers by Israeli settlers have become much more frequent in recent years. It is due, in part, to the establishment of more settlements and the "thickening" of existing settlements. That those settlements are being established on the periphery of Arab towns and villages has given rise to more friction in day-to-day relationships between the Arab residents and the settlers and very often to physical confrontation in public places. Instances have been reported where settlers have taken over land belonging to local villagers, as in the village of Beit Awwa (A\/37\/485, para. 136). Settlers from the Shilo settlement have fenced off 500 dunums belonging to the village of Quryut. hh<\/u>\/ Eight-hundred dunums have been claimed by Adumin settlers from the residents of Rumein and Anatra villages (A\/37\/485, para. 143).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

101. \t<\/span>Cases of individual harassment have frequently been reported. Palestinian farmers have been threatened or molested while working on their land by settlers who claimed the land belonged to the settlements. Fruit trees on private land have been uprooted or destroyed. Armed settlers have tried to take over houses inhabited by Arabs, have attacked residents and have sometimes kidnapped them, particularly students and young people, on the grounds that they had participated in demonstrations (A\/37\/485, paras. 136, 138, 139 and 141).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

102.\t<\/span>Those confrontations have become more serious, following the formation of Israeli settlers and civil administration employees into paramilitary units to assist the security forces in maintaining law and order in the occupied territories. Members of those units, along with security forces, have used firearms, wounding and sometimes killing Arab residents participating in demonstrations. That has been justified by the occupying authorities as being in compliance with Zahal directives, which authorize such shooting in case of danger of life. ii<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

103. \t<\/span>The Arab residents of the occupied Palestinian territories continue to be restricted in their movements, more so since the escalation of demonstrations against the occupation, in general, and against specific policies and actions of the occupying authorities, in particular. The frequent curfews imposed on Arab towns, villages and refugee camps disrupt the daily activities of the people in commerce and business, travel to work, including work-places in Israel, attendance at school and performance of religious <\/strong>duties. Most affected by those curfews were the residents of Ramallay, El Bireh, Halhul and the refugee camps of A-Dahaysha and Askar and <\/strong>Balata.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

104. \t<\/span>Movement of individuals representative of the Arab leadership in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continues to be restricted by their confinement to their towns or places of residence or by the Government's refusal to issue travel permits. The editors of the newspapers Al Fajr<\/u>, Ashab and Attalia were placed under house arrest and not allowed to leave their towns of residence.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

105. \t<\/span>New regulations and procedures have been introduced with regard to crossing the bridges between the West Bank and Jordan, which have made it more difficult for the Arab residents of the occupied territories and their relatives living and working abroad to maintain communication and family relationships. As at June 1982, West Bank residents could no longer fill in the required forms themselves, attach a revenue stamp and travel to the bridge. Fees for crossing the bridges have been increased to 15 Jordanian dinars for an adult to cross from the West Bank into Jordan and 5 JD for a child. There is a further "service" charge of 5 JD for an adult, and a charge of 1 to 3 JD is made on luggage. The fee for a person crossing from Jordan into the West Bank is 20 JD and the fees have to be paid in Jordanian dinars or other hard currencies. If the person leaving the West Bank is under 26 years of age, he cannot return before nine months, on the assumption that he is a student. Those above 26 years of age are allowed to stay out of the occupied territories up to three years, whereas previously it was one year. A Palestinian who exceeds the three-year limit even by a day, is disqualified from returning to the occupied territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

106. \t<\/span>Relatives living abroad who want to visit their families in the occupied territories have to await a permit, which the family has to obtain beforehand from the occupying authorities. On arrival at the bridge, the person, whether visiting or residing in the <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

territories, is subject to a number of physical examinations. Contents of suitcases are electronically examined. A person can take in only 1,000 JD and anything above that amount would be confiscated unless prior approval had been obtained. On entering the occupied territories, the person cannot leave until a week has elapsed; otherwise, special permission has to be obtained to leave the territories. It should also be noted that there is no telephone communication or mail service between Jordan and the occupied territories. All this information was gathered from travelers crossing the King Hussein Bridge during the experts, visit there on 1 March 1983 and from the personal experiences of relatives living in Jordan who had occasion to visit their families in the occupied territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

107.\t<\/span>The truckers of produce from the occupied territories, who were interviewed by the experts on mission at the King Hussein Bridge on 1 March 1983, mentioned the various disadvantages under which they operated. They have to use pre-1967 trucks, as those are registered under Jordanian law. Yet they have to obtain Israeli operating licenses, which have to be removed on entry into Jordan. Any new trucks purchased cannot be used for transport of goods into Jordan. The trucker has to pay a number of fees every time he crosses the bridge and every time he returns to the West Bank, his truck is subjected to inspection, for which he has to pay a fee. He has to return to the territories within 24 hours and, if he overstays that <\/strong>period, his truck is subjected to a thorough inspection, which can immobilize his use of the truck for up to a week. The extra taxes and fees he has to pay, all in Jordanian dinars, add to the delivery costs of the produce.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

108. \t<\/span>Other instances of harassment, which have been reported both in the Israeli press and in Arabic newspapers, include parents who are punished for actions by their children; whole communities which are punished for individual acts of protest; arbitrary arrest and removal for interrogation; demolition of houses for alleged terrorist activities; punishment by expulsion; arrest, interrogation, release on bail and then re-arrest as a deterrent to participation in demonstrations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

109.\t<\/span>The flow of information to residents of the occupied territories has been further curtailed through new regulations governing censorship. The Arab newspapers, Al Fajr<\/u>, Ashab and Al Quds<\/u>, had received new orders from the Military Administration requesting them to submit to its censorship all articles and photographic materials before publication. The order was to be in force until the end of 1982. It has not been possible to ascertain if this order is still in force. The Civil Administration, which was established in the latter part of 1981, has, on a number of occasions, prevented the distribution in the West Bank of the three East Jerusalem Arabic daily newspapers. Ashab was confiscated for 43 days.  Al Fajr<\/u> (English edition) was heavily censored. About 50 per cent of the articles submitted were totally censored, although some of them had been quoted from the Israeli dailies (A\/37\/485, para. 100).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

110. \t<\/span>The prerogative of self-determination in matters of local concern, heretofore exercised by the Arab population of the occupied territories through their elected municipal councils, has been severely eroded by the dismissal of' mayors and the dissolution of certain councils and the ever-present fear that similar action might be taken against other mayors and councils, if they decided to pursue policies which were at variance with those of the occupying authorities. The appointment of village leagues, which have no popular base, and the support given to those leagues by the occupying authorities have tended to diminish further the role of the elected bodies to make decisions for advancing the development and well-being 'of the indigenous population of the occupied territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

111. \t<\/span>Recent events, particularly involving the Israeli settlers in the occupied territories, have caused serious concern among the Arab population about their freedom of worship and development of their culture in consonance with current trends in the Arab countries. There has been constant interference with religious worship, for example, at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, where Israeli settlers from Kiryat Arba tried to gain entrance on numerous occasions. Incidents occurred at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, where Israelis have tried to break in. In another instance, a student tried to set fire to the Mosque; he was arrested by the Israeli Police. Kiryat Arba Yeshiva students burst into the Temple Mount area and tried to hold prayers there (A\/37\/485, paras. 133, 134, 140 and 142). The firing that occurred at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in April 1982 is well known. The latest incident, which was reported in The London Times<\/u> of 12 March 1983, involved 40 heavily armed Jewish militants, among whom were some from the Israeli military forces, who attempted to establish a symbolic settlement on the Temple Mount, which is regarded as one of the holiest Islamic Shrines after Mecca and Medina.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

B.\t<\/span>Education<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

112.\t<\/span>School attendance in the occupied territories continues to increase in keeping with the population increase in the school-going age groups. In the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), the number of pupils increased by 14,598 in the two year period, 1979\/80 to 1981\/82, an annual average of 7,299 pupils. To accommodate this increase, the number of schools has increased by 24. The number of classes has increased by 464. There has been a slight increase in the average number of pupils per class, which was around 35 in 1981\/82, both in the Government and UNRWA schools. The average per class in the other private institutions had been less; namely 28. In the Gaza Strip, the number of pupils increased by 10,892 in the same two year period, an annual average of 5,446 pupils. The number of institutions increased during the period by 26 of which 19 were UNRWA institutions. The number of classes increased by 242. The average number of pupils per class was around, 40 in government schools and 45 in the UNRWA schools. Because of the large refugee population residing in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA plays a major role in the educational system there. jj<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

113. \t<\/span>The educational system follows the normal structure of 6 years of primary and 3 years of preparatory education (both compulsory), followed by secondary, vocational, teacher training and\/or university education. The curricula continue to be those in use at the time of the occupation, namely, the Jordanian one in the West Bank and the Egyptian one in the Gaza Strip. In East Jerusalem, the Israeli educational system and curriculum have been adopted in the education of the Arab pupils.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

114. \t<\/span>The Ministry of Education of the Jordanian Government continues to have an interest in the state of education in the West Bank and keeps abreast of developments. Approximately 2,000 teachers who had been appointed before the occupation, continue to be paid by the Jordanian Government, although it has no administrative control over the system. The high school diploma issued by the Military Administration of the occupied territories is replaced by one from the Jordanian Ministry of Education.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

115.\t<\/span>It is the view of the Jordanian ministry of Education officials, who met with the experts on mission, that although the structure of education in the West Bank remains the same as prior to the occupation, the content of education is in a state of stagnation. Developments which have occurred in the Jordanian system are not reflected in the system in the West Bank. There was constant interference in attempts to revise the curriculum to incorporate changes in Arab culture and society. Books which are recommended for use in classes are closely scrutinized, modified, revised and reprinted by the occupying authorities. The revisions often distort facts as they relate to the students' understanding and perception of their <\/strong>socio-cultural background and heritage. Most affected by this practice are books in literature and in the social sciences. Teachers who try to remedy these shortcomings and attempt to create nationalistic sentiments in the students are subjected to transfers, dismissals and other punitive measures including arrest, detention and fines. There have been also occasions when pupils expressing such sentiments have been arrested, incarcerated or transferred to other schools. School attendance and fulfillment of course requirements have been seriously affected in those localities, including the refugee camps in which UNRWA imparts education, where curfews have been imposed for various reasons.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

116. \t<\/span>University education has been subjected to further pressures during the last few years, which have affected the quality of the education imparted. Two military orders which directly affect the universities are Order No. 854 of 8 July 1980 and Order No. 973 of 9 June 1982. The most significant event arising from the application of Order No. 854 has been the expulsion, in October 1982, of 28 professors of Palestinian origin teaching in the various universities in the West Bank for refusing, as a matter of principle, to sign a "pledge" not to support any "terrorist organization". Twenty-one of them have been from the Al Najah University. Seven professors of foreign nationality were debarred from lecturing for the same reason. The result was a reduction in the number of elective courses. Other consequences were a reduction in the required hours for a course and larger attendance in classes. Frequent closing of the universities has aggravated the situation. For example, the Bir Zeit university was closed from 19 February to 19 April 19821 Bethlehem university from 13 June to 5 July 1982 and Al Najah University from 14 to 23 January 1983. kk<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

117. \t<\/span>The security forces of the occupying authorities have continued to put up road blocks at the entrances to universities. Soldiers have entered the university premises on occasion and searched student dormitories, confiscating books, reviews and posters. On other occasions students have been arrested and detained for varying periods of time (A\/37\/485, para. 94).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

118. The universities are subjected to other forms of control under Order No. 854 as well as administrative directives, the more significant of which are the need to renew annually the license to operate the university and to obtain the Military Administration's approval of the annual budget. No books can be ordered directly from abroad. They have to be obtained through booksellers in Israel, and they have to be approved by the military Administration. In the process, many books and periodicals, mostly in literature, history, culture and related subjects, which are essential for research, have been banned, although they are available in the Israeli universities and libraries. In the view of the professors expelled from Al Najah University, some of whom, met with the experts on mission in Amman, those actions by the occupying authorities have seriously undermined the scope and quality of university teaching in the West Bank and affected the standard of education achieved by the student body, comprising approximately 10,000.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

119. Military Order No. 973 of 9 June 1983 pertaining to the transfer of funds to the occupied territories has created difficulties for the universities, whose resources are from private donations, to be financially viable. By that Order, any money coming from abroad, and this would include donations to the universities, requires a permit to be issued at the discretion of the Head of the Civil Administration. A provision in the Order (para. 3 (b)) stipulates that a "permit will not be granted unless the bringing in of money to the 'region' is intended for remittance to the Fund established by Order No. 974 also of 9 June 1982, entitled, Order with regard to the Region Development Fund<\/u>. The purpose of the Fund is stated to be to give grants or loans for development programs in the "region" <\/strong>and for the relief of the population. The "region" is defined as "Israel and any other Region occupied by the Israel Defense Forces".<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

120. \t<\/span>In the view of the former professors and university officials, the implications of the provisions of these two orders, in so far as the universities are concerned, are that any donations from abroad, most of which come from other Arab countries to the universities, are beyond the control of the university authorities, who have no assurance that the Fund will disburse the donations for the purpose for which they were intended.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

121. \t<\/span>With regard to vocational training, the ILO mission, which has access to the occupied territories, has been evaluating the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the program during the past few years. It should be mentioned that UNPAA is actively involved in it, and there are significant inputs to it from the Â鶹APP system, notably UNDP, UNICEF, the ILO, UNESCO, UNIDO and WHO in the form of equipment and fellowships.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

122. \t<\/span>UNRWA operates vocational training centres, two in the West Bank (Kalandia Vocational Training Centre and Ramallah Women's Training Centre) and one in Gaza (Vocational Training Centre). Courses are said to be designed for the acquisition of skills in designing, producing, assembling, servicing or repairing manufactured products and in business and office practice, land surveying, paramedical skills etc. The training is available to refugee children. ll<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

123. The Israeli authorities have stated that the program sponsored by them for non-refugee youth has been expanded to include new fields, such as draftsmanship, accounting, office work and cosmetic training, in addition to such trades as carpentry, construction, metal-working, sewing and embroidery and dressmaking, which formed the bulk of vocational training in previous years (A\/37\/347 and Corr.1, annex, p. 5). According to information supplied to the ILO mission by the occupying authorities, new courses have been introduced in manufacturing skills, and special vocational training programs have been introduced for youths 14 and 15 years of age who continue to pursue academic studies; courses are offered in vocational skills during school holidays. mm<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

124. In its evaluation of the program, the ILO mission has observed that:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>"The training courses still tend to be short and the level of skills they provide does not seem to have risen significantly. moreover, the training centres operate in close liaison with the placement offices in the occupied territories, essentially so as to meet the demand for labor from employers in Israel." nn<\/u>\/\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

During a visit to the biggest vocational training centre in Gaza, the ILO mission observed that 80 per cent of the graduates worked in Israel. On a visit to a training centre in the West Bank, it was observed that almost half of the graduates worked in the Arab countries of the Gulf, while the other half worked in Israel and the occupied territories. oo<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

C.  Health<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

125.\t<\/span>It is a complex task to analyze the nature and scope of a health-care system that would meet the needs of a given population at a given time, because of such variables as demographic structure, stage of socio-economic development, orientation of the people to health care, utilization of the services provided and the availability of trained manpower to deliver those services, among others. In the case of the occupied Palestinian territories, the World Health Assembly has received in recent years annual reports on the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories from various sources, in response to its resolutions beginning with WHA 26.56 of 23 May 1973. Three reports were submitted to the World Health Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1982, namely, the report of the Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories (A35\/16), a report by the Palestine Liberation Organization (A35\/INF.DOC.\/3) and a report by the Ministry of Health of Israel (A35\/INP.DOC.\/4). Additionally, the annual Statistical Abstract of Israel<\/u> gives data on hospitals and hospitalization.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

126.\t<\/span>Statistical data pertaining to hospitals in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 21<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

West Bank<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

Gaza Strip<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

1981<\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Hospitals (total<\/p>\n

 of which:<\/p>\n

  governmental<\/p>\n

Actual beds (total)<\/p>\n

 of which:<\/p>\n

  in governmental<\/p>\n

  hospitals<\/p>\n

Hospitalized patients<\/p>\n

Occupancy(percentages)<\/p>\n

Surgical operations<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

    17<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

     9<\/p>\n

 1,406<\/p>\n

   970<\/p>\n

64,019<\/p>\n

  83.0<\/p>\n

14,604<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

    17<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

     9<\/p>\n

 1,311<\/p>\n

   970<\/p>\n

65,011<\/p>\n

  81.4<\/p>\n

14,454<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

    17<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

     9<\/p>\n

 1,363<\/p>\n

   970<\/p>\n

65,302<\/p>\n

  79.2<\/p>\n

14,085<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

     6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

     5<\/p>\n

   890<\/p>\n

   815<\/p>\n

51,948<\/p>\n

  66.7<\/p>\n

13,750<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

     7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

     6<\/p>\n

   928<\/p>\n

   853<\/p>\n

53,230<\/p>\n

  66.1<\/p>\n

12,973<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

     7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

     6<\/p>\n

   904<\/p>\n

   858<\/p>\n

55,378<\/p>\n

  64.0<\/p>\n

13,294<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

127.\t<\/span>In the Gaza Strip, the number of hospital beds increased slightly from 1979 to 1980, only to decrease in 1981. In the West Bank, there was a sharp drop from 1979 to 1980, with a modest increase in 1981. The variance in bed availability has been attributed by the Israel Ministry of Health to be the temporary closure of certain sections in the voluntary hospitals in the West Bank. pp<\/u>\/ There are inconsistencies in the data given in the report of the Ministry of Health of Israel and in the annual Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>. For instance, the total number of beds in the five governmental hospitals in the Gaza Strip is 845 in the report of the Ministry of Health, qq<\/u>\/ while the data above gives it as 858 in 1981. The nine governmental hospitals in the West Bank are reported as having 650 beds, rr<\/u>\/ while the data above indicates 970.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

128.\t<\/span>An added constraint to analyzing meaningfully the health-care data is that their compilation and presentation by the Israel ministry of Health vary for the two territories. The WHO Special Committee of Experts has noted that "the statistical data are extremely contradictory, depending on the source". ss<\/u>\/ It has been reported that in the Gaza Strip, a monthly and an annual medical bulletin have been published since 1981, while in the West Bank, only an annual report has been prepared; a new monthly information system is in the course of preparation. tt<\/u>\/ It is to be hoped that the information will be presented in a uniform manner so as to make the data of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip comparable, and that more information will be provided on the data pertaining to the voluntary hospitals, which constitute almost half of the institutions and provide almost 29 per cent of the beds available in that territory. It will also be useful to know how the services of the voluntary hospitals are integrated into a total health-care system for the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

129.\t<\/span>As regards services provided by the hospitals, the Israel Ministry of Health report mentions a number of new services introduced since 1967. Since 1979, the following new services have been setup in the hospitals in the occupied territories:<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Table 22<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Hospital<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Services<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Year<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Nablus<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Ramallh<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Beit Jallah<\/p>\n

Hebron<\/p>\n

Rafidia<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Coronary Care Unit<\/p>\n

Oncology clinic<\/p>\n

Physiotherapy and rehabilitation<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Ear, nose and throat<\/p>\n

X-ray<\/p>\n

Neonatal unit<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Physiotherapy<\/p>\n

Gynaecology\/obstetrics<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Ophthalmology<\/p>\n

Dermatology<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Intensive care unit<\/p>\n

Ear, nose and throat<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

Shifa<\/p>\n

Khan Unis<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Ophthalmic Hospital<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Maxillofacial surgery<\/p>\n

Burn unit<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Bacteriology Laboratory<\/p>\n

Intensive coronary unit<\/p>\n

Library and lecture hall<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Psychiatry<\/p>\n

Psychiatric outpatient department<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Source<\/u>: Report by the Ministry of Health of Israel transmitted to members of the World Health Assembly under the symbol A35\/INF.DOC.\/4.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

130. \t<\/span>This expansion of services seems to be in keeping with the policy of the occupying authorities to decentralize activities and services to the level of district hospitals and peripheral health centres. However, according to the WHO Special Committee of Experts, limitation of equipment and qualified staff to deliver these services make it necessary for an increasing number of patients from the occupied territories to be referred to Israeli hospitals. Other measures and services related to environmental health, immunization and maternal and child care are provided through a network of clinics and health centres.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

131. The WHO Special Committee of Experts, during its visit to the territories in April 1982, observed that there had not been any fundamental change in the health infrastructure during the previous year. uu<\/u>\/ Medical and surgical equipment supplied during the year, particularly the more sophisticated items, included many given by international organizations and local charitable organizations. All new equipment installed at the Ramallah hospital had been financed by local charitable organizations. A new dialysis unit and an echocardiograph installed at the Hebron hospital were provided by UNDP.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

132. \t<\/span>Inadequacies were observed by the Special Committee of Experts at various hospitals. Taking Ramallah and Nablus hospitals, which according to the Israeli authorities serve as regional as well <\/strong>as district hospitals, vv<\/u>\/ shortcomings included cardiology and radiology services and equipment, shortage of drugs and lack of adequate staff. <\/strong>Other problems at hospitals include ambulance services, lack of co-ordination at the central level in drug distribution, and difficulties in recruiting teaching staff. It was mentioned to the WHO Special Committee of Experts by the local doctors and mayors that "substantial funds could be mobilized immediately to develop medical services and public health infrastructure that was lacking, but that the requests submitted to the Israelis had been unsuccessful". ww<\/u>\/ Refusal of a request submitted to the Israeli authorities by a local association in Hebron to build a hospital is cited as a specific example.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

133.\t<\/span>The number of hospital beds has not shown a real significant increase during the last 10 years, in spite of the growth in population. The organization of teams of specialists and adequate resources to respond to the basic health needs of the people is a feature that is lacking in the planning and delivery of health care services in the occupied territories. There is no systematic program of education for health and nutrition. Sanitation is far from satisfactory, although the Israel Ministry of Health has <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

reported that many improvements have been made in the towns and villages of the occupied territories, particularly the Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

134. There are significant inputs to the health care system in the occupied' territories by UNDP, WHO, UNICEF and by local organizations and the Red Crescent Society. This has become necessary because of the low level of budgetary resources allocated to the system. A significant shortcoming would appear to be a lack of planning for the health needs of the population in association with local medical professionals, leaders and community organizations. Community participation at the present time appears to be only at the level of implementing projects and programs already formulated by the Israeli authorities or the provision of physical facilities for services which have been predetermined, rather than at the formulation stage.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Notes<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>A35\/16.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>b<\/u>\/\t<\/span>The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, The<\/u> Occupation … Israeli Colonization of Arab Lands (revised edition<\/u>) (Amman, January 1983), p. 10.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>c<\/u>\/\t<\/span>P. G. Sadler and B. Abu-Kishk, "Options for development: Palestine, Part 10 (unpublished), p. 68.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>d<\/u>\/\t<\/span>"Living conditions in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District", summary of the report prepared by the Government of Israel, submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (A\/37\/347 and Corr.1, annex), pp. 2-4.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>e<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., p. 2.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>f<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Meron Benvenisti, "The West Bank and Gaza Data Base Project: Pilot Study Report", presented to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1982 (unpublished), p. 55.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>g<\/u>\/ \t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., p. 67.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>h<\/u>\/\t<\/span>The Occupation …,<\/u> op. cit<\/u>., p. 9.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>i<\/u>\/\t<\/span>The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, "Palestinian living conditions in the Arab territory" (Amman, February 1982 to February 1983) (unofficial translation), paras. 2 and 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>j<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See, for example, Showkat Mahmoud, West Bank Water and Agriculture under Israeli<\/u> Occupation<\/u> (Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, Amman, November 1982), p. 2 (31.6 per cent between 1967 and 1979); and Emile Sahliyeh, "West Bank industrial and agricultural development: the basic problems", Journal of Palestinian Studies<\/u>,  No. 42 (winter, 1982), p. 64 (27.3 per cent between 1967 and 1973).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>k<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Meron Benvenisti, op. cit <\/u>, pp. 29-31.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>l<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., p. 32.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>m<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Raja Shehadeh, "The West Bank and the rule of law", The International Commission<\/u> of Jurists and Law in the Service of Man<\/u> (Geneva, 1980), pp. 59-62.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>n<\/u>\/\t<\/span>The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, op. cit.,<\/u> p. 9.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>o<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Israeli terminology for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>p<\/u>\/\t<\/span>"Living conditions in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District", op. cit<\/u>, p. 10.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>q<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Janet Abu-Lughod, "Israeli settlements in occupied Arab lands: from conquest to colony", Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denials<\/u>, Ibrahim Abu-Lughadt ed. (Medina Press, Wilmette, Illinois, 1983), pp. 135-336.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>r<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Raja Shehadeh, op, cit<\/u>., p. 62.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>s<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Turkaya Ataov, "The Israeli use of Palestinian Rights<\/u> Affirmation and Denial<\/u>, op._cit<\/u>., p. 153.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>t<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., p. 154.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>u<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Meron Benvenistif op. cit<\/u>. p. 25.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>v<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Raja Shehadeh, op. cit<\/u>., p. 66.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>w<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See A\/37\/347 and Corr. 1, annex, p. 9.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>x<\/u>\/\t<\/span>International Labour Conference, Sixty-eighth Session, 1982, Report of the<\/u> Director-General<\/u>, appendix II, para. 7.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>y<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., para. 31.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>z<\/u>\/\t<\/span>For Israel: 8 months of work in agriculture and construction and 12 months in industry and other branches, giving an average of 10 months or 40 weeks of 6 days each week. For the territories: 50 weeks of 6 days each week.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>aa<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Meron Benvenisti, op. cit<\/u>., p. 16.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>bb<\/u>\/ \t<\/span>For instance, the Jordanian Times<\/u> of 28 February 1983 quoted the Jordanian dinar at 113.46 Israeli shekels.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>cc<\/u>\/ \t<\/span>See "The industrial: and economic trends in the West Bank and Gaza Strip", (E\/ECWA\/UNIDO\/WP.1, tables 5 and 7).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>dd<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., table 15.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>ee<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., p. 37.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>ff<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., p. 33.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>gg<\/u>\/ \t<\/span>Report from the Economic Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, 10 March 1983, p. 29.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>hh<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Al Fajr Weekly<\/u>, 8-14 January 1982.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>ii<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Jerusalem Post<\/u>, 16 May 1983, and Al Fajr Weekly<\/u>, 28 May-3 June 1982.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>jj<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Figures derived from the data in appendix V below.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>kk<\/u>\/ \t<\/span>Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Report of the Ministry of Occupied Territories<\/u> Affairs, February 1982 to February 1983<\/u>, annex 8.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>ll<\/u>\/\t<\/span>UNWA\/UNESCO Department of Education, 1980-81 Report<\/u>, <\/u>p.31.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>mm<\/u>\/\t<\/span>International Labour Conference, op. cit<\/u>., para. 23.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>nn<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., para. 24.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>oo<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>pp<\/u>\/ \t<\/span>World Health Organization, "Health and health services in Judaea, Samaria, Gaza-and Sinai, 1981-19820, a report by the ministry of Health of Israel to the Thirty-fifth World He alth Assembly, Geneva, March 1982 (A35\/INF.DOC.\/4), annex, table 41.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>qq<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., table 14.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>rr<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Ibid<\/u>., table 41.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>ss<\/u>\/ \t<\/span>World Health Organization, "Report of the Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories" (A35\/16), para. 2.1.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>tt<\/u>\/\t<\/span>World Health Organization, A35\/INF.DOC.\/4, annex, p. 17.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>uu<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See World Health Organization, A35\/16.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>vv<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See World Health Organization, A35\/INF.DOC.\/4, annex, p. 70.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>ww<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See World Health Organization, A35\/16, para. 3.3.<\/p><\/div>\n


<\/p>\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

APPENDIX I<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Houses demolished, 1967-1981<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n
\n

Year<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1967<\/p>\n

1968<\/p>\n

1969<\/p>\n

1970<\/p>\n

1971<\/p>\n

1972<\/p>\n

1973<\/p>\n

1974<\/p>\n

1975<\/p>\n

1976<\/p>\n

1977<\/p>\n

1978<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Number<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

130<\/p>\n

140<\/p>\n

301<\/p>\n

191<\/p>\n

231<\/p>\n

 35<\/p>\n

 34<\/p>\n

 61<\/p>\n

 77<\/p>\n

 24<\/p>\n

  1<\/p>\n

  2<\/p>\n

  8<\/p>\n

 24<\/p>\n

 32<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

TOTAL                      1 291<\/p>\n

________________________________<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1 263 on the West Bank<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   28 on the Gaza Strip<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Ministry of the Occupied Territories Affairs, Amman, Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

APPENDIX II<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Population growth in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem)<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

and Gaza Strip, 1979-1981<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(Thousands)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

End of<\/p>\n

year<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Number of<\/p>\n

persons<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Actual<\/p>\n

increase<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Natural<\/p>\n

increase<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Difference<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

1979<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

699.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

703.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

707.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

9.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

3.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

4.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

20.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

20.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

20.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

-11.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

-17.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

-15.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

1979<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

431.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

442.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

451.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

12.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

10.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 9.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

16.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

15.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

15.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 -3.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 -5.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 -5.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:   Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1981<\/u> and 1982<\/u> (Jerusalem, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1981 and 1982).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

APPENDIX III<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Employed persons by economic branch in the<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

occupied territories and in Israel<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

1979<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1980<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

Total (thousands)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

133.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

134.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

132.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

Percentages<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

1.<\/p>\n

2.<\/p>\n

3.<\/p>\n

4.<\/p>\n

5.<\/p>\n

6.<\/p>\n

7.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Agriculture, forestry and fishing<\/p>\n

Industry, mining, manufacturing<\/p>\n

Construction<\/p>\n

Commerce, restaurants, hotels<\/p>\n

Transport, storage, communications<\/p>\n

Public and community services<\/p>\n

Other<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

 25.3<\/p>\n

 18.3<\/p>\n

 22.6<\/p>\n

 12.7<\/p>\n

  4.4<\/p>\n

 12.8<\/p>\n

  3.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 26.2<\/p>\n

 16.9<\/p>\n

 22.6<\/p>\n

 12.7<\/p>\n

  4.5<\/p>\n

 13.3<\/p>\n

  3.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 24.1<\/p>\n

 16.4<\/p>\n

 24.0<\/p>\n

 12.5<\/p>\n

  4.9<\/p>\n

 14.2<\/p>\n

  3.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Total (thousands)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

 79.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 80.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 82.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Percentages<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

1.<\/p>\n

2.<\/p>\n

3.<\/p>\n

4.<\/p>\n

5.<\/p>\n

6.<\/p>\n

7.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Agriculture, forestry and fishing<\/p>\n

Industry, mining, manufacturing<\/p>\n

Construction<\/p>\n

Commerce, restaurants, hotels<\/p>\n

Transport, storage, communications<\/p>\n

Public and community services<\/p>\n

Other<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

 20.4<\/p>\n

 19.8<\/p>\n

 23.0<\/p>\n

 12.5<\/p>\n

  6.4<\/p>\n

 12.1<\/p>\n

  5.8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 18.5<\/p>\n

 19.5<\/p>\n

 23.1<\/p>\n

 14.0<\/p>\n

  6.6<\/p>\n

 13.0<\/p>\n

  5.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 17.3<\/p>\n

 17.2<\/p>\n

 26.5<\/p>\n

 14.2<\/p>\n

  6.8<\/p>\n

 12.8<\/p>\n

  5.2<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:   Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

APPENDIX IV<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Employed persons of the occupied territories by selected<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

economic branch and place of work<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

In Israel<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

        In the occupied territories<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

___Total___<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

___Total____<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Year<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Other<\/p>\n

branches<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Cons-<\/p>\n

truction<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Industry<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Agri-<\/p>\n

culture<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

%<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

'000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Other<\/p>\n

branches<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Cons-<\/p>\n

truction<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Industry<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Agri-<\/p>\n

culture<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

%<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

'000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

1979<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

18.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

19.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

19.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

47.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

50.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

52.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

23.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

21.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

10.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 9.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 9.3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

39.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

40.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

39.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

40.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

40.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

41.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

11.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

10.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

11.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

15.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

15.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

15.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

31.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

33.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

30.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

92.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

94.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

93.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

1979<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

14.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

16.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

15.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

44.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

44.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

49.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

21.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

20.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

20.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

16.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

34.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

34.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

35.9<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

53.7<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

55.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

57.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

 7.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 7.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 8.4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

18.2<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

16.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

21.1<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.8<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

18.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

45.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

46.3<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

46.6<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

APPENDIX V<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Education in the occupied Palestinian territories<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Academic year<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

1979\/80<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

1981\/82<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem)<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Number of institutions<\/p>\n

Number of classes<\/p>\n

Number of pupils<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Number of institutions<\/p>\n

Number of classes<\/p>\n

Number of pupils<\/p>\n

Academic Year 1981\/82<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

  1 012<\/p>\n

  7 457<\/p>\n

253 826<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

    281<\/p>\n

  3 455<\/p>\n

142 113<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

  1 036<\/p>\n

  7 921<\/p>\n

268 424<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

    307<\/p>\n

  3 697<\/p>\n

153 005<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Institutions<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Classes<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Pupils<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Government<\/p>\n

UNRWA<\/p>\n

Other<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Government<\/p>\n

URNWA<\/p>\n

Other<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

  802<\/p>\n

   93<\/p>\n

  141<\/u><\/p>\n

1 036<\/p>\n

  112<\/p>\n

  157<\/p>\n

   38<\/u><\/p>\n

  307<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

6 069<\/p>\n

1 058<\/p>\n

  794<\/u><\/p>\n

7 921<\/p>\n

1 749<\/p>\n

1 791<\/p>\n

  157<\/u><\/p>\n

3 697<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

208 867<\/p>\n

 37 267<\/p>\n

 22 290<\/u><\/p>\n

268 424<\/p>\n

 68 852<\/p>\n

 79 493<\/p>\n

  4 660<\/u><\/p>\n

153 005<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1981<\/u> and 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

APPENDIX VI<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Consumer price index, West Bank and Gaza Strip<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Year<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Percentage<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

increase<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Percentage<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

increase<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

1979<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1980<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1981<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  1975 = 100<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

   440.6<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 1 054.5<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

 2 257.5<\/p>\n

<\/td>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

139.4<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

114.1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

  402.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

1 031.0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

2 160.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

155.9<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

109.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:  Statistical_ Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

APPENDIX VII<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Wage-income by sectors and location of employment, 1981<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

GAZA STRIP<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n\n

In Israel<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

In Gaza Strip<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Number<\/p>\n

'000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Daily wage<\/p>\n

(Israeli<\/p>\n

shekels)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n

IS '000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Number<\/p>\n

'000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Daily wage<\/p>\n

(Israeli<\/p>\n

shekels)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n

IS '000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Agriculture<\/p>\n

Industry<\/p>\n

Construction<\/p>\n

Other<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Total (per day)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 5.8<\/p>\n

 6.6<\/p>\n

17.8<\/p>\n

 5.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 76.7<\/p>\n

 99.4<\/p>\n

120.4<\/p>\n

103.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  444.9<\/p>\n

  656.0<\/p>\n

2 143.1<\/p>\n

  590.0<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

3 834.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 8.4<\/p>\n

 7.7<\/p>\n

 3.9<\/p>\n

26.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 75.0<\/p>\n

 85.0<\/p>\n

112.0<\/p>\n

100.5 a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  635.9<\/p>\n

  654.5<\/p>\n

  436.8<\/p>\n

2 673.3<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

4 400.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

WEST BANK<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

In Israel<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

In Gaza Strip<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/p>\n

Number<\/p>\n

'000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Daily wage<\/p>\n

(Israeli<\/p>\n

shekels)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n

IS '000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Number<\/p>\n

'000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Daily wage<\/p>\n

(Israeli<\/p>\n

shekels)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

Total<\/p>\n

IS '000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n

Agriculture<\/p>\n

Industry<\/p>\n

Construction<\/p>\n

Other<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Total (per day)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 3.7<\/p>\n

 7.2<\/p>\n

21.0<\/p>\n

 8.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 76.7<\/p>\n

 99.4<\/p>\n

120.0<\/p>\n

103.5<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

  284.0<\/p>\n

  715.7<\/p>\n

2 520.0<\/p>\n

  828.0<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

4 347.7<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

28.5<\/p>\n

14.7<\/p>\n

11.1<\/p>\n

39.2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

 70.6<\/p>\n

 89.2<\/p>\n

122.0<\/p>\n

 97.4 a<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/p>\n

2 012.1<\/p>\n

1 311.2<\/p>\n

1 354.2<\/p>\n

3 818.1<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

8 495.6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

Note<\/u>:  Wage-income<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/p>\n
\n

In Israeli shekels<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

West Bank:<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Gaza Strip:<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Employment in Israel<\/p>\n

Employment in West Bank<\/p>\n

Employment in Israel<\/p>\n

Employment in West Bank<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

4 347 700 (daily) x 240 days = 1 043 448 000<\/p>\n

8 495 600 (daily) x 300 days = 2 548 680 000<\/p>\n

West Bank subtotal             3 592 128 000<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

3 834 000 (daily) x 240 days =   920 160 000<\/p>\n

4 400 500 (daily) x 300 days = 1 320 150 000<\/p>\n

Gaza subtotal                  2 240 310 000<\/u><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

West Bank and Gaza     TOTAL   5 832 438 000<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Source<\/u>:\t<\/span> Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982<\/u>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>a<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Weighted average for commerce, transport, public and community services and other.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

—–<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

lvngcond.83<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories Report of the Secretary-General 1. In its resolution 34\/113 of 14 December 1979, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant Â鶹APP organs and specialized agencies, particularly the Â鶹APP Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[1323],"document-source":[1365,1362],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[1937,2097],"entity":[1729],"document-language":[6542],"class_list":["post-187278","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-report","document-source-general-assembly","document-source-security-council","document-subject-economic-issues","document-subject-social-issues","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/187278","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/187278\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=187278"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=187278"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=187278"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=187278"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=187278"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=187278"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=187278"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=187278"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}