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Nickolay Mladenov

High Representative for Gaza / Board of Peace

Security Council Briefing

21 May 2026

[As Delivered]

Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Council for a second time. When I last appeared before you, the framework for the decommissioning of weapons in Gaza had been agreed among the guarantors and presented to the parties, and I told you the engagement was serious. The first written report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025) of the Board of Peace is now before you. It records what has been done. What I want to do today is something a report cannot do. I want to explain, in plain language, what we are actually asking of the parties and why we are asking it.

Mr. President,

Let me begin where everything begins, with the people.

Some things have changed for the better, and we should be neither too proud nor too cautious to say so. The guns have largely fallen silent across Gaza for the first time in two years. Every hostage has been returned to their family. Before last autumn, around thirteen hundred trucks a week entered Gaza, and the overwhelming majority of that aid was being either looted or seized by armed groups before it reached its intended beneficiaries. Since the ceasefire that figure has significantly increased and the hunger situation has improved meaningfully for the population, and humanitarian aid diversion has fallen to around one per cent. The number of people receiving food assistance has risen from four hundred thousand to roughly two million. None of this was inevitable. None of it should be taken for granted.

But I will not stand before this Council and call this recovery, because there is no recovery. Around eighty-five per cent of the buildings in Gaza are damaged or destroyed. Some seventy million tons of rubble lie where homes and schools and hospitals used to stand, much of it mixed with unexploded ordnance. More than a million people have no permanent shelter. They are living, this morning, in tents and in the broken shells of buildings. Roughly eighty out of every hundred working-age Palestinians in Gaza have no work. Water is scarce. The health and education systems have not been rebuilt; they have been broken.

And the ceasefire, the most important part, which is holding, but it is holding in a way that is not perfect. There are violations. Some of them are serious. They mean civilians are still being killed. They mean families still live in fear and uncertainty. They mean that movements on the ground, restrictions and delays continue to obstruct humanitarian access and ordinary life. This is the sad reality of today, but the ceasefire is the foundation of the entire transition ahead of us; every violation risks unravelling what has been painstakingly built; and this Council should accept nothing less than maximum restraint and the honouring of commitments already made by all sides.

I would ask the Council to hold two things in view at once, as I asked you the first time I sat in this meeting. The horror of the seventh of October does not lessen the suffering of the Palestinian people, and the suffering of the Palestinian people does not lessen the horror of the seventh of October. The entire purpose of what this Council authorized in Resolution 2803 (2025) is to make certain that neither is ever repeated or perpetuated.

Mr. President,

Let me explain to the Council how we arrived at the document that we refer to as the Roadmap to complete the implementation of President Trump’s Gaza Comprehensive Peace Plan, which is now before the parties, because the manner of its making matters as much as its content.

Since December, my office and the guarantors of the ceasefire — Egypt, Türkiye, Qatar and the United States — have worked together to design the next implementation steps of the twenty-point Comprehensive Plan. In December the principles of the civilian and security transition framework were agreed among the guarantors. From those principles we built a detailed proposal for implementation. It has been put to the Palestinian factions in session after session. After rounds of consultations and based on feedback from the factions to the proposal, a 15-point Roadmap, accompanied by a proposed implementation annex, was written in response to the questions and the concerns the factions themselves raised. This has never been a take-it-or-leave-it text, and I want the Council to hear that clearly. It is a serious instrument, built by the guarantors, revised in the light of what the parties said.

The architecture of that Roadmap rests on a single principle. The principle is reciprocity. Each step by one side triggers a step by the other. It is also? built around a fact that none of us can wish away: the tragedy that trust between Israelis and Palestinians is below zero today. So the design introduces a verification mechanism. Each step is confirmed by an independent committee before the next is taken. If a step is missed, the next step is not taken.

Mr. President, let me take the Council through the Roadmap, so that there is no mystery about what it offers.

It opens with five principles.

The first binds every party to implement, in full, both Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025) and the Comprehensive Plan, and it states the purpose plainly: to end the cycle of destruction, to restore civilian life, to enable Palestinian governance, reconstruction, security and economic recovery — and through that, to open a credible path to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

The second principle states that every outstanding obligation under the Ceasefire agreement must be completed, in full and without delay before the next stage. In plain terms: the things promised to the people of Gaza at the start — aid, fuel, the crossing, shelter, and completion of all the measures included in the Sharm el-Sheikh humanitarian protocol? — are not forgotten and not optional. They are to be delivered before anyone is asked to implement the next step. This is a sequencing mechanism designed to ensure fair implementation. Let me be clear: we had secured guarantees from Israel that, once Hamas commits to this Roadmap, Israel will move promptly to fulfill its remaining commitments under the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement. Hamas’ agreement to the 15-point Roadmap would have allowed the guarantors and my team to work with both parties on defining the steps and timelines of the implementation of the Roadmap. To date, despite our best efforts and the efforts of the guarantors, that has not happened.

The third principle is the gate itself. No stage begins until the obligations of the stage before it has been verified and certified by an Implementation Verification Committee — a body composed of representatives of the guarantors, the International Stabilization Force and the Board of Peace. This is the reciprocity principle made operational. It means no party can be asked to move on the strength of a promise. It means progress is earned, step by step.

The fourth principle sets out the chain of authority, and it is worth stating it precisely because it is so often misunderstood. The Board of Peace, established under the Plan and endorsed by this Council, oversees governance, reconstruction and redevelopment until a reformed Palestinian Authority can resume its responsibilities in Gaza. It acts through the Office of the High Representative, which connects the Board to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) and holds the civilian and security tracks together. Under the same mandate, the Board and cooperating States stand up the International Stabilization Force. This is a temporary, accountable, internationally mandated bridge, not a substitute for Palestinian government, but the scaffolding that allows Gaza to be rebuilt.

The fifth principle, as per the Comprehensive Plan, states that Hamas and the other factions will have no role in the governance of Gaza — not directly, not indirectly, not in any form — and it states, in the same breath, that every civil servant will be treated lawfully, fairly and with dignity, with their rights fully respected. I want the Council to note that those two sentences sit together deliberately. What ends is rule by the gun — not the livelihoods of public servants in Gaza.

Mr. President, the next group of provisions concern security.

The sixth principle establishes the governing rule of the entire transition: one authority, one law, one weapon. Only personnel authorised by the National Committee (NCAG) may carry arms; all armed groups must cease military activity. This is not an Israeli demand. It is a Palestinian principle. It is the formulation President Abbas himself has used, in public, for years. No society anywhere has ever recovered with armed structures operating in parallel to its governance. Not one.

The seventh principle deals with the issue of the police. Newly trained officers are folded into the existing civil police structures; every officer is vetted; those who do not meet the standards are offered unarmed roles or compensation, not abandonment; and all police weapons pass to National Committee’s (NCAG) control as soon as the Committee enters Gaza. This is how you build law and order without a vacuum.

The eighth principle is critical. Decommissioning of weapons will be gradual, sequenced and time-bound, against an agreed timetable. It will be monitored and supported. It will be Palestinian-led, with weapons transferred to the NCAG. All armed groups, and the text says that explicitly, including the militias, take part, to decommission all weapons and all militant infrastructure. And then the sentence I want every person listening to this briefing to hear: no Palestinian armed group will be required to transfer its weapons to Israel. This means weapons do not pass to an adversary; they pass to the NCAG. None of this can be done all at once or in the dark, but it can be done in stages, on a clock, overseen by international monitors. And it applies to everyone, because a rule that binds only one faction protects no one.

The ninth principle places personal weapons under Palestinian law, with the National Committee (NCAG) as the sole authority to register them, to license them, and to collect what is unlicensed — through a phased process using buy-back, reintegration and social support, with the factions committing to cooperate.

The tenth principle is a guarantee. No one will be required to give up their personal weapon until appropriate security and implementation milestones are met and verified by the authorized bodies. This ensures that personal safety is protected throughout the transition.

The eleventh principle is very important. It is a social peace agreement — a binding commitment to stop internal killing and violence at once; to end shows of armed strength, parades and armed demonstrations; and a strict moratorium on reprisals of any kind. It is the promise that this transition does not become a settling of scores.

Mr. President, the next provisions concern the stabilization force and the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the other half of the reciprocal bargain.

The twelfth principle places the International Stabilization Force (ISF) between Israeli forces and NCAG-controlled areas. It is a buffer. It does not police Gaza. Palestinian police Gaza. It supports decommissioning and it protects humanitarian operations.

The thirteenth principle commits Israel to a phased withdrawal of its forces to Gaza’s perimeter, on an agreed timetable, tied to verified progress on decommissioning and deployment of the International Stabilization Force.

The fourteenth makes the NCAG responsible for addressing security violations in areas that are fully decommissioned and certified as under its control.

Read together, these are the answers to what most people in Gaza are asking — when do Israeli forces leave? When does rule by the gun end? — and the answer is clear: as decommissioning is verified, sector by sector, the IDF should? withdraw and Palestinians should take responsibility.

Mr. President,

The fifteenth principle is short, and it is the engine of everything else: reconstruction can take place at scale in the areas that are certified as decommissioned and effectively administered by the NCAG. Ultimately, National Committee (NCAG) administration and certified decommissioning are both critical to unlocking internationally backed, large-scale reconstruction. The faster this transition takes place, the faster Israeli forces withdraw and Gaza is rebuilt.

Mr. President,

While I continue to call on Hamas and the other Palestinian factions to come back to the table and engage constructively on the Roadmap and next steps to implement their commitments under the Comprehensive Plan, let me also say clearly that implementation cannot advance through Palestinian obligations alone. The continued killings, Israeli restrictions and delays affecting humanitarian flows are not abstract issues. They shape daily Palestinian perceptions of whether the war is over and if this process can genuinely deliver safety, dignity and recovery.

These realities prolong humanitarian suffering, but they also weaken confidence in the ceasefire framework itself. Palestinians and Israelis must be able to see, in practical terms, that commitments made under the ceasefire and the Sharm el-Sheikh understandings are being implemented fully and in good faith.

This is precisely why the Roadmap was built around reciprocity and verification.

Obligations apply to all parties.

Let me also be precise about what the Roadmap does not ask.

It does not ask Palestinians to surrender their weapons to Israel.

It does not seek to erase political constituencies

It does not seek retribution. It offers conditional amnesty to those who decommission and live according to the law; reintegration and financial support for those who must step away from positions of authority; safe passage for those who choose to go.

The questions of how things are done — the timing, the manner, the dignity of it — are precisely the implementation discussions should focus on.

Mr. President, let me briefly speak about what a refusal to accept this Roadmap means.

If transition and decommissioning are delayed or refused, the Board of Peace will discuss meaningful and practical modalities to advance civilian stabilization, humanitarian relief and recovery, based on the architecture the parties have agreed to when the Comprehensive plan was developed, approved by the Arab and Islamic states and endorsed by the UN Security Council.

While the Board of Peace continues its work, I want to be clear about the risks of inaction by the parties. The risk is that the deteriorating status quo becomes permanent: a divided Gaza; Hamas holding military and administrative control over two million people across less than half the territory. Those people are likely to remain trapped in the rubble, dependent on aid, with no meaningful reconstruction — because reconstruction financing will not follow where weapons have not been laid down. No investment. No movement. No horizon. And the result? Another generation of children growing up in tents, in fear, with despair as the most rational thing for them to feel. No security for Israel and no viable pathway to Palestinian self-determination.

This is a version of the future that Israelis, Palestinians and the region should all fear and all mobilize to avoid.

And I will say one more hard thing. The discussions have now matured to the point where the core political choices are clear and further delay will only deepen civilian suffering.

The resources are ready to launch this next phase of implementation and the commitments to disburse as-needed are firm. This is not an obstacle.

Every day that passes is another day of a child in a tent without a school, a father without work, a family without a better future. That is the price of delay, and it is a price paid in Gaza, by Palestinians.

Mr. President, if President Trump’s plan is allowed to succeed, Gaza will not merely be repaired. It can be rebuilt — by Palestinians, for Palestinians. Goods can move through crossings instead of trickling under restrictions. A port can handle trade. Young people can queue for universities, not for rations, and can be free to travel with what they have learned. Electricity can come from a grid, not a generator. A child born next year can grow up in a house, not a tent, and can be taught in a school, not a shelter. Tens of thousands of public-sector jobs can be created in the first year of reconstruction alone; a quarter of a million within five years.

None of that is a dream.

Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

Let me close with three final observations.

First, the Roadmap that has been presented for the full implementation of the 20-point plan is credible, fair and balanced. It is built on reciprocity — no one is asked to trust, everything must be verified. It deserves this Council’s clear, consistent and unequivocal support. Transition and decommissioning are not only required by Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025), but are the only credible road to real reconstruction, to the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and to a Palestinian political horizon.

Second, I ask the Council to use every means at its disposal it has to urge Hamas to accept the Roadmap without further delay, and Israel to uphold its obligations under the ceasefire. Diplomacy must continue. It cannot be used as an excuse for delay while two million people wait in desperate conditions.

Third, and last, the choice before the parties has not changed since I first described it to this Council, and I will not soften it now. It is a deteriorating status quo, or a new beginning. There is no third option. There never was. And the people of Gaza should not be made to wait while some pretend that there is.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Related document:

• “Recovery in Gaza must advance the underlying political objectives: the reunification of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under a single, legitimate, sovereign Palestinian government”, UN Special Coordinator says tells Security Council – Question of Palestine