Â鶹APP

The application was withdrawn by the Applicant in light of a settlement agreement.

From the moment that the new Executive Secretary took up his functions at ESCWA, the Deputy Executive Secretary was no longer competent to decide, on 8 August 2007, to reassign the Applicant. Indeed, there is no documentary evidence that he had received delegation of authority from the Executive Secretary to take the contested decision, which is thus illegal. However, on 16 August 2007, the Executive Secretary confirmed the decision taken on 8 August 2007 by his Deputy. This new decision is legal but it does not have the effect of regularizing ex post facto the decision of 8 August 2007...

In accordance with article 18, paragraph 2, of its rules of procedure, the Tribunal may order the production of evidence for either party and the parties have to provide such evidence, even though they consider it to be confidential. According to article 18, paragraph 4, of its rules of procedure, it falls upon the Tribunal to assess the confidentiality of the evidence and, if it finds the evidence to be confidential, it is the Tribunal¡¯s responsibility to ensure that measures are taken to preserve such confidentiality. In the instant case, the Tribunal did not use the confidential documents...

No exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of time limits prescribed in former staff rule 111.2 (a) could be found. The Applicant having served for long time in the Organization, she had ample opportunity to become familiar with the applicable rules. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the applicant to be acquainted with the rules on time limits. The Applicant was not induced into error by MEU response as to the outcome she could expect from a procedure before the Tribunal. The transition to the new justice system cannot be said to have affected the Applicant¡¯s ability to timely...

The Applicant¡¯s request for review is time-barred as far as the decision not to renew her appointment is concerned. As regards both the non-renewal of the Applicant¡¯s contract and the alleged mishandling of her visa request (even assuming that such mishandling could be linked to an administrative decision subject to appeal), the Applicant, in the absence of a response from the Secretary-General within two months of her request for review, had one month to file an appeal with the JAB. The appeal is time-barred as well. Given that the time limits prescribed in staff rule 111.2 (a) were not...

In accordance with former staff rule 111.2 (a) (i), the Applicant had only one month as of the receipt of the Secretary-General¡¯s reply to submit an appeal to the JAB. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant received the reply to her request for review on 31 January 2008 and that the JAB received her appeal only on 31 March 2008. Hence, the Tribunal considered that the Applicant¡¯s appeal was late. The Tribunal examined the record of facts and concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed, which may justify a waiver of the time limits for the submission of the statement of appeal to the JAB...

At the time the Applicant submitted his application to the Tribunal, the Administration had already reviewed its initial decision to grant the Applicant a three-month extension and extended him for an additional nine-month period. The Tribunal determined that since the contested decision was de facto rescinded by the Administration before the application was filed with the Tribunal, the application is not receivable. Had the Administration rescinded its decision after the filing of the application, the application would have become moot during the proceedings and the Tribunal would have...

Under the given circumstances, the application for an extension of time could not be considered as an application on the merits. No exceptional circumstances for an extension of time could be found. Lack of legal counsel normally does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Since the Applicant had learned one month before the end of the time limit that OSLA would not take her case, it was appropriate and reasonable for the Applicant to submit an application by herself within the time limits.

In cases deemed suitable to be decided by summary judgment, usually an oral hearing is not necessary. In non-disciplinary cases, it is a matter of judicial discretion to hold an oral hearing or to abstain from it. The mandate of UNDT is confined to the review of administrative decisions. Although the definition of this term may be disputed, it is beyond question that administrative decisions must by essence be taken by the Administration. Since the decisions of former UNAT are judicial decisions, they cannot be contested before UNDT. The provisions on transitional measures apply to pending...

The mandate of UNDT is confined to the review of administrative decisions. Although the definition of this term may be disputed, it is beyond question that administrative decisions must by essence be taken by the Administration. Since the decisions of former UNAT are judicial decisions, they cannot be contested before UNDT. The provisions on transitional measures apply to pending UNAT cases only. They do not include the power to revise UNAT judgements. Cases closed by judgments of former UNAT are res iudicata.